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Preface
The liberalization of the electricity markets has increased the need for perfor-
mance assessment. The ability to produce qualitative performance indica-
tors for an existing or planned power system is essential in order to improve
overall efficiency.
The reliability of supply is directly affected by a reduction in investment. To
compare the gain in reliability against the required investments, a monetary
evaluation of reliability performance is required. Such is possible by calcu-
lating expected interruption costs for groups of customers.
Currently used methods for assessing interruption costs are either slow and
inexact, or bare the risk of producing unrealistic results. It was believed that
it would be worth to try for an alternative calculation method that would be
accurate, yet fast, and realistic enough to be practicable.
It was shown in the Licentiate thesis, which was published in February 2001,
that an alternative stochastic model had been found in the Weibull-Markov
model and it was shown that the methods based on that model had potential.
This thesis is based on and contains large parts of the licentiate thesis. The
chapters in which the Weibull-Markov model was introduced are reproduced
here without important changes. It is shown in this thesis that the Weibull-
Markov methods and models are a good alternative for the commonly used
homogenous Markov models.
This Doctor Thesis would not have been possible without the constructive
cooperation between Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden and
DIgSILENT GmbH in Germany; without the patience of Dr. Martin Schmieg
(at DIgSILENT); without the suggestions of Dr. Markus Pöller (at DIgSI-
LENT); without the discussions with Math Bollen (my examiner at Chalmers)
or without the love of Wille Groenewolt (at home).
Gomaringen, Baden-Württenberg, May 12, 2003,
Jasper van Casteren

Abstract
Modern competitive electricity markets do not ask for power systems with
the highest possible technical perfection, but for systems with the highest
possible economic efficiency. Higher efficiency can only be reached when
accurate and flexible analysis tools are used. In order to relate investment
costs to the resulting levels of supply reliability, it is required to quantify sup-
ply reliability in a monetary way. This can be done by calculating the ex-
pected interruption costs.
Interruption costs evaluation, however, cannot be done correctly in all cases
by methods which are based on the commonly used homogenous Markov
model and is time consuming when using a Monte-Carlo simulation. It was
the objective of this thesis to find a new way for calculating interruption costs
which would combine the speed and precision of the analytic Markov method
with the flexibility and correctness of the Monte Carlo simulation.
A new calculation method was found, based on a new stochastic model.
This new model was called the “Weibull-Markov” model and is described in
detail in this thesis. The new model and methods have been implemented in
a computer program and the speed and accuracy of the calculation method
was tested in various projects and by comparison with Monte-Carlo simula-
tions.
It is shown in this thesis that disregarding the effects of the probability dis-
tribution of the interruption duration can lead to large errors, up to 40 % and
more, in the calculated expected interruption costs. An estimation of the
possible error has been made for a large number of published customer in-
terruption cost functions. The actual error in specific reliability calculations is
hard to estimate. It is however clear that this error cannot be simply ignored.
The use of the new Weibull-Markov model and the reliability assessment
methods do not significantly slow down the calculation speed, offer more
flexibility in reliability worth assessment and produce more accurate results.
They can be used in all areas of power system reliability assessment which
have always been the exclusive domain of homogenous Markov modeling.
keywords: power system reliability, reliability worth, semi-Markov model, in-
terruption costs, customer damage function, duration distribution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In Western Europe, the availability of electric energy has been long regarded
as a basic provision for economic development and prosperity. Centralized
and monopolistic companies were therefore formed to design, construct and
control the electrical power systems. These companies strove for technical
perfection in a growing market where the risk of over-investment was consid-
ered low. Consequently, the electrical power systems in this part of the world
are among the most reliable and well designed. Fig.1.1 shows some values
for the unavailability of the electricity supply, expressed in average minutes
lost per year ([45]). This figure shows large differences between various
European countries. Where the average non-availability of electricity in Italy
is around 200 minutes per year, it is about 25 minutes in the Netherlands.
However, the probability of being not supplied in Italy is still very small and
equals 200/(8760*60)=0.00038. This means that electric power is available
in 99.962 % of time. In the Netherlands and Germany, where the average
non-availability is less than 25 minutes per year, the availability is more than
99.995 % of time. This is astonishingly good, considering that we talk about
a very large and complex technical system.
However, modern competitive electricity markets are believed to no longer
demand for power systems with the highest technical perfection, but for the
economically most efficient. The liberalization of the electricity markets that
resulted from this believe has since forced electric companies to find a new
balance between technical perfection and maximum profit.
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Figure 1.1: European Comparison of unavailability
A perfect power system is a power system where all loads are continuously
supplied by electricity of constant nominal voltage without any waveform
distortion. Of course, such systems do not exist. All loads will suffer supply
interruptions sometimes, the voltage or current will always show deviations
from nominal values and waveforms will always be distorted to some extent.
The question is how bad this is. What levels of imperfection can be toler-
ated? At which levels will we have the highest achievable efficiency? High
levels of perfection can only be reached by high investments and will thus
cause high prices. Low levels, however, will lead to all kind of costs due to
insufficient performance, such as ([45]) :
• Economic penalties payable to affected customers or into funds.
• Tariff reductions or other revenue affecting penalties by regulating.
• Customer loss due to negative publications.
The liberalization of the electricity markets forces the electricity companies
to view their power plants, transmission networks and distribution systems
in a new light. In order to survive in the open market, it is required to reduce
costs and to maximize returns on investments.
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It is the task of reliability engineers to support the decision processes in the
planning phases by providing power system performance indicators. Invest-
ments can then be judged by the gain in performance.
The calculation of (expected) performance indicators in respect to supply
reliability can be divided into the calculation of non-monetary interruption
statistics and reliability worth assessment. Reliability worth assessment pro-
duces monetary indices, and is a relatively young discipline.
This thesis introduces a new stochastic model which can be used to produce
monetary indices more correctly, in a fast analytic way, based on a flexible
definition of damage caused by customer interruptions.
1.1 Quality and Reliability
Electric power is used by consumers to operate electrical machines and ap-
pliances. When that is possible without exceptions, then such consumers
will be satisfied and we have sufficient power quality. Power quality is thus
a measure for the ability of the system to let the customers use their electri-
cal equipment. Any peculiarity or fault in the power system that (might) pre-
vent the use of electrical devices or (might) interrupt their operation means
a lack of power quality.
The ability of the system to let customers use their equipment is determined
by the extent to which the voltage and/of the current of the consumer’s power
supply are ideal. All deviations from the ideal are called power quality
phenomena or power quality disturbances. A power quality phenomenon
can be a sudden change of values, a limited period of lesser quality, but also
a continuous situation in which some (sensitive) equipment can not be used
properly.
Continuous or slow changing offsets from a perfect power quality are called
voltage variations or current variations. Phenomena which suddenly appear
and which have a limited duration are called power quality events.
In [30], an exhaustive description of power quality variations and events is
given. Possible power quality variations are:
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• Voltage/current magnitude variations
• Voltage frequency variations
• Current phase variations
• Voltage and current unbalance
• Voltage fluctuations (“flicker”)
• Harmonic distortion
• Interharmonic components
• Periodic voltage notching
• Mains signaling voltages
• High frequency voltage noise
and some example of power quality events are:
• Interruptions
• Undervoltages
• Overvoltages
• Voltage magnitude steps
• Voltage sags
• Fast voltage events (“transients”)
Power quality variations, as listed above, are examples of the voltage qual-
ity or current quality of the electric supply. Power quality variations, how-
ever important and interesting, are not further considered in this thesis.
The power quality events can be divided into two groups:
• Interruptions
• Other voltage quality events
4 May 12, 2003
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Depending on the duration of the event, momentary, temporary and sus-
tained interruptions can be distinguished. Reliability analysis is the field of
research which calculates the number and severity of power interruptions.
It is divided into the field of security analysis and adequacy analysis. Secu-
rity analysis calculates the number of interruptions due to the transition from
one situation to the other. Adequacy analysis looks at interruptions which
are due to the non-availability (“outage”) of one or more primary components
in the system. The position of adequacy analysis in the whole area of power
quality analysis is illustrated by Fig.1.2.
U n d e r - ,  O v e r v o l t a g e s
V o l t a g e  m a g n i t u d e  s t e p s
F a s t  v o l t a g e  e v e n t s
V o l t a g e  s a g s
P o w e r  Q u a l i t y
P o w e r  Q u a l i t y
E v e n t s
P o w e r  Q u a l i t y
V a r i a t i o n s
I n t e r r u p t i o n s
D u e  t o  O u t a g e
D u e  t o  T r a n s i t i o n  
R e l i a b i l i t y  A s s e s s m e n t
S e c u r i t y  A n a l y s i s
A d e q u a c y  A n a l y s i s
Figure 1.2: Power Quality and Adequacy Analysis
The subject of this thesis is power system adequacy analysis. Security anal-
ysis is not further addressed.
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One method for determining the number of interruptions is by monitoring
voltages and counting the number of interruptions.
For the use of deciding, from the monitored voltages, when an interruptions
occurs, a criterion like the one in the IEEE std.1159-1995 can be used.
This standard defines an interruption as an event during which the voltage
is lower than 0.1 p.u. A sustained interruption is defined as an interruption
with a duration longer than 1 minute.
When monitoring a real power system we normally have the situation that all
kinds of events can cause interruptions, but that the exact causes for spe-
cific captured interruptions are often unknown. That is why some minimum
voltage like 0.1 p.u. is required as criterion for an interruption. A criterion like
“not longer connected to a source of electric power” cannot be used for mea-
surements, as the network condition is normally unknown when classifying
the voltage measurement.
A completely different situation occurs when reliability calculations are made
with a computer program using digital network models. In that case, only
a very specific set of events will happen, namely only those events which
have been modeled. For each analyzed interruption, it is known in detail
why the interruption occurred and the status of all parts of the power system
is completely known. On the other hand, a voltage at the interrupted load
points is normally not calculated. That is why we need a different definition
for an interruption when we perform reliability analysis.
For the purpose of the assessment of reliability indices by system modeling
and mathematical analysis, it can be assumed that as long as a customer
is still physically connected to the power system, he will be supplied. Only
when a customer is disconnected from the system, it is called an interrup-
tion.
The interruptions of customers are caused by failing equipment, or by main-
tenance which is performed to prevent equipment from failing. Failures are
events where a device suddenly does not operate as intended, and failures
occur in all parts of the power system. Cables are damaged, for example,
by digging activities, lighting strikes, breakers suddenly open, transformers
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burn out, etc., etc. Every reliability analysis must start by recognizing and
modeling all relevant failures which may affect the system’s reliability.
A failure, or a possible future failure, may lead to the temporarily removal of
one or more primary devices from the system. The situation where a primary
device is removed is called an outage and the removed device is said to be
‘outaged’. An outage will bring the system in a weakened condition.
Primary devices are removed in order to clear a fault, to prevent further dam-
age or weakening of the system, to repair a faulted device or for performing
maintenance. All equipment that is de-energized or isolated is said to be
outaged. Not all outages result from failures, however, and not all failures
will lead to outages. When devices are deliberately removed from the sys-
tem for preventive maintenance, then that is called a “scheduled outage”
or “planned outage”. An outage which is an inevitable result of a failure is
called a “forced outage” or “unplanned outage”.
Outages may lead to situations in which customers are not longer supplied
with electric power. As mentioned before, such an event is called an in-
terruption. Not all outages will lead to interruptions. Many components,
especially at higher voltage levels and in industrial systems, are operated in
parallel. After the outage of one component, the parallel one will take over
immediately and the load or customer will not experience an interruption.
The reserve capacity of a power system which is used to compensate for an
outage is called “redundancy”. Redundancy improves the reliability.
Besides causing interruptions, outages may also affect the system’s ability to
perform scheduled transports of power without violating technical or opera-
tional constraints. Often, outages in meshed high-voltage transport systems
will not lead to interruptions, but they generally affect the transport capaci-
ties. Outages in radially operated distribution systems on the other hand will
normally not affect transport capacity, but will often lead to interruptions.
The relation between failures, outages, interruptions and reduced transport
capacity is shown in Fig.1.3
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Figure 1.3: Failures and possible results
1.2 Reliability Assessment
Reliability assessment, although targeted at only one aspect of power qual-
ity, is nevertheless a wide area itself. Three basic types of reliability assess-
ment can be recognized:
• Monitoring of system performance
• Deterministic reliability assessment
• Stochastic reliability assessment
The monitoring of system performance is performed by capturing the num-
ber, type and duration of interruptions. This is indispensable for gathering
detailed information about the performance of power system components. It
is also used for bench-marking purposes which are, for instance, used for
market regulating.
System performance monitoring, however, can normally not be used to as-
sess the reliability of individual parts of the networks. The size of such net-
works is often so small that years of monitoring would be required in order
to reach some statistical significance. Of course, it can also not be used to
compare design alternatives for system expansion planning.
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Deterministic reliability assessment can be based on active failures (faults)
or on outages. Deterministic outage-based reliability assessment will per-
form an outage effect analysis for each relevant outage in the system. Each
outage may cause the interruption of one or more loads or may cause over-
loading of parallel parts of the system. The well-known “n-1”, or “n-k”, anal-
ysis is an example of such analysis. Deterministic outage-based reliability
assessment produces qualitative results, telling if criteria are met or not, but
may also produce quantitative results such as capacity margins, maximum
loading, maximum interrupted power, etc.
Deterministic fault-based reliability assessment does not analyze the effect
of outages, but the effects of faults (active failures). The difference is that
the reactions of the power system are considered in a fault effect analysis
whereas they are neglected in an outage effect analysis. Typical system
reactions to a fault are (in chronological order)
• Fault clearance by protection
• Fault isolation
• Power restoration
A fault effect analysis may produce several sets of outage conditions, each
with a different duration. Each of these conditions will be analyzed for inter-
ruptions and overloads. More detailed criteria can then be used to judge the
adequacy of the system. It may, for instance, be acceptable to have some
interruptions as long as power to the interrupted loads can be restored within
30 minutes, or short-term overloading can be tolerated. Such criteria cannot
be tested with an outage effect analysis only.
Stochastic reliability assessment adds to a deterministic fault-based reliabil-
ity assessment in two aspects:
• It may also consider passive failures
• It uses stochastic failure models
The use of stochastic models allows the calculation of averaged indices, by
combining the results of the various failure effects analysis on the basis of
the failure frequencies and/or probabilities.
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Stochastic failure models define the expected number of times a failure will
happen per unit of time, and how long it will take to repair the failed com-
ponent. During the repair, the failed component will be out of service, and
all customers which cannot be supplied without the component will be inter-
rupted for the duration of the repair. Mathematical expressions are used
to calculate the probability or the severity of the interruptions, using the
stochastic failure data. The possibilities for calculating interruption sever-
ity depend on the used stochastic model. If the severity depends not only on
the mean interruption duration, but also on the probability distribution of the
duration, then the commonly used homogenous Markov models complicate
such severity calculations. The new Weibull-Markov model, to be introduced
in chapter 3 of this thesis, is more suited for calculating interruption severity
indices.
In stochastic reliability assessment, each relevant failure is analyzed in a
failure effect analysis (FEA). A typical FEA uses a multitude of power system
analysis tools, such as
• topological analyses for finding isolated areas, power restoration swit-
ches, etc.
• loadflow calculations for overload detection
• linear optimization tools for overload alleviation
• short-circuit analysis for fault clearance
• interruption costs calculations
The combination of the results of the performed FEA’s into averaged results,
on the basis of the stochastic data, is currently done in roughly two ways
• By Monte Carlo simulation
• By analytic calculations, using Markov models
Monte Carlo simulation is the repeated chronological simulation of the power
system. During each simulation, faults will occur randomly, as in real-life,
and the reactions of the system to these faults is simulated chronologically.
The performance of the system is then monitored during the simulations.
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The advantage of Monte Carlo simulation is that all aspects of the power
system can be addressed and there are no limits to the stochastic models
or to the possibilities for measuring performance. The disadvantages are
the often very high computational demands. Monte Carlo simulation pro-
duces stochastic results only, which are inexact, but for which it is possible
to calculate variances and even probability distributions.
Analytic calculations range from matrix manipulations to state enumeration
techniques. State enumeration means that all relevant failures will be ana-
lyzed one by one, as with the deterministic fault effect analysis. The results
of each of these analysis are then added together by using the stochastic
failure and repair data.
Analytic calculations on the basis of the Markov model are normally much
faster than Monte Carlo simulations, and they produce exact results. Vari-
ances can be produced also, but probability distributions are normally not
feasible. The disadvantage of the analytic Markov methods is that there are
severe limitations to the calculation of interruption costs indices.
1.3 Objectives of this thesis
The main objective of this thesis is to present a new method with which a
correct assessment of interruption costs indices by analytic calculations is
possible. The presented method is based on a new stochastic model, which
is called the “Weibull-Markov model”. The Weibull-Markov model is a semi-
Markov model which uses Weibull distributions for the state durations.
The second objective of this thesis is to show that the Weibull-Markov model
can replace the homogenous Markov model in reliability analyses, and that
this replacement removes the limitations with regard to the calculation of
interruption costs indices without introducing new restrictions.
1.4 Contents of this thesis
An introduction into power system reliability assessment is given in chapter
2. This introduction includes an overview over the various failure models
that can be used for reliability assessment. The various steps and methods
May 12, 2003 11
Introduction
that are used for the failure effect analysis (FEA) are discussed in chapter
2.3. Stochastic models are introduced in chapter 3. This chapter covers the
basics of homogenous Markov models and introduces the Weibull-Markov
model. Interruption costs assessment is discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5
discusses the results for an example distribution network.
12 May 12, 2003
Chapter 2
Power System Reliability
Assessment
2.1 Basic Scheme
The assessment of the reliability of a power system means the calculation
of a set of performance indicators. An example of such an indicator is the
LPAIF, or the "Load Point Average Interruption Frequency", which equals the
average number of times per year a load point suffers an interruption. Two
different sets of indicators can be distinguished: local indicators and system
indicators. Local indicators are calculated for a specific point in the system.
Examples are
• The average time per year during which a specific generator is not able
to feed into the network
• The average duration of the interruptions at a specific busbar.
• The interruption costs per year for a specific customer.
System indicators express the overall system performance. Examples are
• The total amount of energy per year that cannot be delivered to the
loads.
• the average number of interruptions per year, per customer.
• The total annual interruption costs.
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Power system reliability analysis can be split into three parts:
1. The definition of a model for the healthy, undisturbed, power system.
2. The definition of possible deviations from the healthy system state,
such as possible failures, changes in demand, planned outages, etc.
3. The analysis of the effects of a large set of healthy and unhealthy sys-
tem states.
The results of the analyses of the various system states is used to calculate
the performance indicators. The basic diagram of the calculation procedure
is depicted in Fig.2.1.
The definition of the initial healthy system state is the starting-point of the
reliability assessment procedure. In this system state, all components are
working as intended. The initial load profile, generator dispatch and switch
settings allow for a normal, healthy, loadflow in which no overloading or volt-
age deviations should be present.
The set of definitions of possible deviations from the initial state is used to
generate events. These events will bring the system in an disturbed state,
such as may occur in the real system. This disturbed state is then processed
by the failure effect analysis, which may react to present faults or other unde-
sirable situations by opening switches, restoring power, performing repairs,
or other changes to the system. This is repeated until enough unhealthy
system states have been analyzed. Finally, the intermediate results are pro-
cessed to produce the various performance indicators.
In order to perform a reliability assessment, we thus have to creates models
for the various failures and other disturbances that that may occur in the
system. Secondly, we have to be able to analyze the effects of these system
disturbances. Thirdly, we have to select the relevant system conditions and
failures that must be analyzed in order to calculate the reliability performance
indicators.
The various failure models and the methods to select relevant system states
are described in the following sections. The Failure Effect Analysis is the
subject of the next chapter.
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Figure 2.1: Basic reliability assessment scheme
2.2 Failure Models
Failures in power systems can be divided into active and passive failures.
Active failures are failures that require an automatic intervention of protec-
tion devices. Passive failures will not directly provoke a reaction of the power
system. Some passive failures will remain undetected until an inspection is
carried out or until the device is called upon to perform its function.
2.2.1 Passive Failures
Passive failures may persist in the system for a long time without further
affecting the system. Although they may cause the interruption of customers
in some cases, they are seldom a direct threat to the system itself. The
reaction time to passive failures is therefore in the range of minutes to hours
or even days to months.
Passive failures can be divided into manifest failures and hidden failures.
Manifest failures will show themselves directly in their effects, where hidden
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failures can exist undetected up to the next inspection or up to the moment
the component is called upon.
Manifest Failures
The following manifest failures can be distinguished:
• Inadvertent breaker opening (mal trip). A mal-trip can occur in four
ways:
– Independent inadvertent breaker open. This is the sudden open-
ing of a breaker either due to a human error, a breaker failure or
an automation failure. The occurrence of these failure is indepen-
dent of the existing state of the network.
– Independent mal-trip. This is the incorrect opening of a breaker
by a protection device without a short-circuit in the system.
– Maintenance related inadvertent breaker open. This may happen
due to incorrect switching in relation to maintenance where, for
instance, backup-equipment is taken out inadvertently.
– Fault-related mal-trip. This is the incorrect opening of a breaker
by a protection device in relation to an existing short-circuit.
• Independent Equipment Trip Independent equipment trips are sud-
den outages primary components due to a fault in the component itself.
Examples are generator trips due to turbine faults or the tripping of a
Buchholz-relay at a transformer.
Hidden Failures
Hidden failures will cause the failed component to not perform the next time
it will be called upon to function. Examples are undetected relay failures,
undetected communication channel failures and stuck breakers.
2.2.2 Active Failures
Active failures are a direct threat to the power system. They may lead to se-
vere damage and even total system collapse when they are not immediately
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cleared. It is the task of automatic protection equipment to react to active
failures and to minimize direct damage to the system.
Four kinds of active failures can be distinguished:
• Single active short-circuits.
• Cross Country faults.
• Common mode faults.
• Overlapping faults.
Single Active Short-Circuits
A single active short-circuit is a fault at a single location which leads to the
immediate isolation of the faulted area by automatic protection devices. The
fault may be either a three-phase, a two phase, a two phase with earth or a
single phase short-circuit.
In compensated networks, it is possible to operate the network with a single-
phase short-circuit long enough to allow for load transfer or other preventive
system reconfigurations. Such is done in order to isolate and repair the fault
without or with a minimum of customer interruptions. The only contribution
of such single phase failures to the unreliability would then be the reduced
redundancy during the repair and the risk of inadvertent switching in relation
to the network reconfigurations and repair.
Single phase short-circuits in compensated networks which do not lead to
automatic protection intervention or load interruptions can be neglected in a
reliability assessment.
Cross Country Faults
A cross-country failure starts with a single phase fault in a compensated net-
work, which is not isolated by protection. Due to the presence of the single
phase fault, the voltage at the other phases is raised by a factor of
√
3. This
increased phase voltage may lead to a second short-circuit somewhere else
in the network, after which one or both failures will be isolated by automatic
protection intervention. The double short-circuit is called a cross country
failure.
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Common Mode Failures
A common mode failure is the simultaneous occurrence of two or more ac-
tive failures due to a single common cause. A common mode failure will lead
to the immediate isolation of all areas which contain the faults. Examples are
• lightning flash-over at multi-circuit towers
• damage to multi-circuit poles or towers due to car accidents
• multiple cable damage due to excavation works
Overlapping Faults
An overlapping fault is a fault which occurs during the outage of one or more
relevant other components. These other components may be on forced out-
age, i.e. on repair, or on planned outage, i.e. during maintenance.
Important is that the outaged components are relevant to the faulted com-
ponent. For the power system of Sweden, for example, it is likely that some
repair or maintenance is going on somewhere at any time. That would mean
that all faults in Sweden will happen during one or more forced or planned
outages, and all faults in Sweden would therefore be “overlapping faults”.
That would make no sense.
In defining overlapping faults, only those outages are regarded which cause
a significant difference in the effects of the occurring fault. In the case of
two parallel transformers, we would have an overlapping fault if the second
transformer fails during the outage of the first. The outage of the first trans-
former is relevant, because this could mean that customers are interrupted
where they would not have been when both transformers were available. In
other cases, the occurrence of an overlapping fault could also mean that
power is restored slower because relevant equipment is not available.
The problem with detecting relevant pre-fault outages is that we would have
to make a failure effects analysis in order to find out that we do not need to
analyze the combination of outage and fault. That would be to late, as we
would already have analyzed it.
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Another aspect of pre-fault outages is that they will change the operational
state of the network. This normally leads to higher loading of backup equip-
ment, which may lead to higher failure rates. Such accelerated faults due to
pre-fault outages always lead to overlapping outages, as it is clear that the
outaged and the faulted component are not independent.
This can also be generalized : we could detect at least a subset of all possi-
ble faults for which a certain outage is relevant by calculating the difference
in pre-outage and during-outage loading of all components. Those com-
ponents which show a significant difference in loading are affected by the
outage and therefore good candidates for an overlapping fault analysis.
Overlapping faults differ from common mode failures because they do not
occur at the same time. More important is that overlapping faults are often
much more seldom than common mode failures, because their frequency
of happening is the product of failure frequency and the probability of the
pre-fault outage, which normally is very low.
This can be shown with the simple example of two parallel cables. Suppose
the independent failure frequency for each cable is once every 5 years =
0.2/a, and that a repair takes 10 hours on average. The probability of being
in repair for each cable is thus 10h · 0.2/a = 2h/a = 2/8760. A year of 8760
hours is used here, which is common practice in reliability assessment. This
means that an overlapping failure will occur
2 · 2
8760
· 0.2/a = 1
10950
/a (2.1)
i.e. once in 10950 years on average. The frequency for a common mode
failure due to digging, for example, is often much higher than that.
2.3 Failure Effect Analysis (FEA)
The task of the Failure Effect Analysis (FEA) is to analyze the ability of the
system to provide all loads with sufficient power after a failure, without violat-
ing the system constraints. If not all loads can be supplied with power, then
the loads which suffer an interruption have to be identified, as well as the
duration of these interruptions. The FEA is a quasi steady-state analysis.
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Load interruptions due to the transient effects of the sudden introduction of
short-circuits and the subsequent opening and closing of switches, are not
considered here. Such transient effects are the subject of security analysis.
The FEA not only comprises the analyses of steady-state system states, but
also includes the simulation of the reactions of the system and the system
operators to faults and other emergency situations. The power system is
actively changed during such a simulation, which may include
• switching actions in order to clear and isolate faults
• switching actions in order to restore power
• switching actions, re-dispatch and load shedding in order to alleviate
overloading
The Failure Effect Analysis is a mixture of short-circuit analyses, load flow
calculations, topological analysis and system simulation. The level of detail
in the FEA is determined by the level of detail in these sub-analyses and
simulations, and so is its complexity and calculating speed.
The output of the FEA is a list of busbars and terminals which are interrupted
due to the failures in the analyzed operational state, each with a description
of the duration of these interruptions. These descriptions can be a single
value in case of a deterministic duration, or a probability distribution in case
of a stochastic duration.
The input data required for performing the FEA are
• the basic system definition
• the operational system state
• the failures in the system
The FEA thus starts with a system in which one or more, possibly active,
failures may be present.
The basic system definition includes all aspects of the power system which
are assumed constant during the reliability assessment, which comprises:
20 May 12, 2003
Power System Reliability Assessment
• the topology of the system
• the electrical models for all primary equipment
• the models of all relevant protection devices
• all relevant loadflow controller models, such as
– secondary controllers
– voltage controllers, tap changer controllers
– shunt and VAR compensator controllers
• emergency and maintenance switching protocols
The topology of the system is considered here independent of switch po-
sitions. The position of a switch, either open or closed, does therefore not
change the basic topology. Also, any possible connection or generator which
may be used in certain emergency conditions, i.e. for restoring power to im-
portant loads, must be defined as a part of the basic system topology.
The electrical models must be accurate enough to allow a valid loadflow
calculation.
The operational system state comprises
• the set of forecasted peak load profiles
• the set of forecasted peak transport flows
• switch positions
• generator availabilities and capacities
• planned outages
• ongoing repairs
Each FEA starts by changing the system model to the current operational
state, and then introduces one or more failures. The effects of these failures
is then analyzed in three phases:
• Primary Failure Effect Analysis
• Secondary Failure Effect Analysis
• Tertiary Failure Effect Analysis
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2.3.1 Primary Failure Effect Analysis
The primary failure effect analysis determines the effects of the automatic
reactions of the power system to the active failures, i.e. the reactions of the
system’s automatic protection devices, such as over-current relays, fuses,
distance relays, under-voltage or over-voltage relays, under-frequency re-
lays, etc.
The results of the primary reactions are the opening of one or more breakers
in the system. Typical reaction times are in the order of milliseconds to a
few seconds. Due to these short reaction times, the primary failure effects
cannot be prevented or modified after the occurrence of the failures. The
objective of the primary reactions of the power system are to minimize the
damage and to minimize the direct effects of the fault to non-faulted parts of
the system.
All active failures must be cleared by the protection. To find out which re-
lays will intervene, a short-circuit calculation is needed. The advantages
of using short-circuit analysis is that fault currents can be established, and
protection selectivity can thus be regarded. The disadvantage is that short-
circuit analysis requires detailed overcurrent, differential and distance relay
models. For many reliability assessment projects, such detailed information
is not available, mostly because the reliability assessment is required in a
stage of project development where the protection system has not been de-
signed yet. Another argument against the use of full short-circuit calculation
is the calculation speed. But even in cases where calculation speed is not
a problem and detailed protection data is available, the use of short-circuit
analysis could complicate the interpretation of the results, because both the
primary and secondary system design would have to be regarded.
If perfect selectivity can be assumed, then a fast topological analysis can
be used to simulate fault clearance. Instead of performing a short-circuit
calculation, a topological search algorithm is started at the fault position.
This algorithm will continue to search the network around the fault position
up to the first relays. The smallest area around the fault which can be iso-
lated by protection devices is thus found. These protection devices are then
assumed to trip. The advantage of this method is, besides its speed, the
minimum requirements on the protection modeling. The only required infor-
mation is the position where protection devices are measuring fault currents
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and which breaker(s) they will open. In the case of a fuse, only the location
is required, and this is also true for many overcurrent and distance relays.
This limited demand for relay information makes it possible not only to start a
reliability assessment in an early stage of system design, but also to quickly
compare various basic protection system lay-outs.
1
a
b a
a
a
b
b
b b
Figure 2.2: Cleared area and backup protection
In Fig.2.2, a part of a network is shown in which a short-circuit occurs. The
topological search algorithm will find the dotted area as the smallest area
that can be isolated in order to clear the fault. The relays at “1” are found as
the relays that will trip. As the faulted area is fed from two sides, two relays
have to be tripped. Breaker fail-to-trip, as would happen when a hidden
failure is present in the relay or the breaker, can be accounted for by not
opening the breaker and letting the topological algorithm search further. In
Fig.2.2, it is assumed that the upper breaker at “1” fails to trip. The next
smallest area to clear is by tripping the breakers at the parallel transformers.
The tripping of these backup relays will mean a prolonged fault clearance
time and the whole area in Fig.2.2 will be tripped.
For the purpose of reliability assessment, the fault clearance time is not im-
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portant. Important is, however, the fact that a much wider area is tripped and
thus more customers are interrupted than without the hidden failure which
led to the fail-to-trip event. If we assume a failure frequency for the fault in
Fig.2.2 of F (1/a), and a fail-to-trip probability of P = Ps + Pr, with Ps for
the breaker and Pr for the relay, then we will have a contribution to the inter-
ruption frequency for the loads “a” in Fig.2.2 of F (1/a) and a contribution of
P · F (1/a) for the loads “b”.
Important is that the short-circuit itself, i.e. the system state directly after the
short-circuit appears and before the first protection devices intervene, is not
regarded. The short-circuit itself and the detailed analysis of fault currents,
remaining voltages and fault clearance times, including the effects of fail-
to-trip events and backup protection, is the subject of voltage sag analysis.
2.3.2 Secondary Failure Effect Analysis
The secondary failure effect analysis considers the reaction of the power
system and its operators to the condition which is reached after the primary
reaction has finished. Typical durations for the secondary reactions are in
the order of seconds to minutes for automatic reactions and in the order
of minutes to hours for manual reactions. The objective of the secondary
reactions are to minimize the duration of the interruptions and to alleviate
any violated operational constraint.
Fault Isolation and Power Restoration
The task of the primary FEA is to clear active failures by isolating the small-
est possible area containing the fault. The area which is isolated to clear
the fault is called the “cleared area”. All loads in the cleared area will suffer
an interruption. It is the task of the fault isolation and power restoration to
simulate the process of fault location, fault isolation, power restoration and
repair. This is done by searching for the smallest possible area around the
fault and subsequently restoring power to as many customers as possible
and as quickly as possible ([57]). Fig.2.3 illustrates this process. The shown
fault in this schematic example will lead to the isolation the whole bottom
feeder by protection. This is the “cleared area”. By manually opening two
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isolators, the fault can be isolated more selectively. Power to the remaining
parts of the cleared area can then be restored and these areas are there-
fore called “restorable areas”. Areas that are actually restored by (re)closing
switches are called “restored areas”.
O p e n /
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Figure 2.3: Cleared, faulted and restored areas
The fault isolation uses the same topological search for switches as has
been used for the fault clearance. A topological search is started at the
faulted components to find the smallest area that can be isolated in order
to isolate the fault. However, in stead at protection devices, the search now
stops at any switch that can be opened.
The faulted area is smaller than or equal to the cleared area. The areas be-
tween the faulted and the cleared area are the “restorable areas” because,
principally, power may be restored to the customers in these areas. The ac-
tual power restoration is performed by finding all switches that can connect
or reconnect a restorable area to a supplied area. One or more of these
switches are then closed to restore power.
Important for the power restoration scheme is that the resulting interruption
times are realistic. The used method must, for instance, regard the effects
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of remote sensing and switching. The interruption duration in the case of
“switched” power restoration, i.e. in the case of power restoration by network
reconfiguration, is determined by the time spend locating the fault, the timer
needed to open the switches that isolate the fault and the time needed to
determine and close the switches through which the power is restored. Each
of these times depend on the amount of automation and remote control in
the network, the presence of short-circuit detectors, the type of relays, the
loading of the network, the accessibility of sub-stations, etc.
After the fault isolation and power restoration phase have finished, the net-
work will be reconfigured and power flow will be different from the pre-fault
situation. In some cases, for instance in many low voltage distribution net-
works, it can be assumed that overloading in the post-fault situation does
not occur. Overload verification can then be omitted, thus increasing the
calculation speed. A simple connection algorithm is used to check if a load
is still physically connected to a generator or external network. When so, the
load can be considered to be supplied.
In many cases, overloading can not be disregarded. This is especially the
case in meshed transmission networks, or highly loaded distribution sys-
tems. Some kind of overload verification must then be used.
Overload Alleviation The observed overloads have to be alleviated. The
way in which this is done depends on the system condition, the fault that
caused the overloading, and on the type of overloading. Overload alleviation
may include
• switching-in backup equipment and cold reserve,
• maintenance or repair cut-off, which means that components which
are currently on outage are brought back into service as fast as possi-
ble,
• network reconfiguration,
• generator re-dispatch,
• load reduction, load transfer and load shedding.
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These three methods are listed in order of applicability. Load shedding is
a last-resort method when everything else fails. Load shedding will lead
to customers interruptions. These interruptions, although caused by oper-
ator intervention, must be looked upon as forced interruptions, and not as
planned interruptions. The frequency and duration of load shedding there-
fore must be added to the interruption statistics.
Linear programming techniques are often used to find the switches to open
or close, the generators to change or the loads to reduce, transfer or shed.
These optimization techniques try to minimize the effects of the overloads
on the customers and are normally based on some linear network flow cal-
culations.
In the case of (sub-)transmission reliability assessment, some load may be
transferred from one feeder to the other by switching actions in the distribu-
tion networks. These networks, however, may only be included in the trans-
mission model as single lumped loads. In that case, load transfer must be
modeled by stating ‘transferable’ percentages and transfer targets for spe-
cific loads. The transfer targets are the loads to which the given percentage
of power is transferred.
2.3.3 Manipulation of the Secondary FEA
The emergency reconfiguration schemes for fault isolation and power resto-
ration normally have a significant effect on the calculated reliability indices.
By correctly locating and isolating the fault and subsequent closing of normal-
ly open switches, the interruption duration can often be drastically reduced.
Improving the supply reliability by improving the emergency reconfiguration
schemes, however, is only feasible when it is possible to associate the im-
pact of a fault with specific schemes. It must then be possible to analyze,
adjust and check these schemes in detail.
It is therefore important to model the fault isolation and power restoration
schemes in a way that they
• reflect reality
• allow fast modifications and experiments
• are transparent and can be checked easily
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• allow for further investigations
The outcome of the secondary FEA is a list of interrupted loads with the
duration of the interruptions. This duration will be deterministic in the case
of a “switched” power restoration, i.e. in the case of power restoration by
network reconfiguration. When switched power restoration is not possible,
the faulted components have to be repaired in order to restore power. Such
“repaired” power restoration will have a stochastic duration.
But even when we assume switched restoration to have a deterministic du-
ration, then we often still have a different interruption duration for different
loads in different restored areas. Another difference in interruption duration
occurs when some loads have to be shed at once, while others will be shed
not before some short-term overloading limit is violated.
It is obvious that the implementation of the secondary FEA will have a sig-
nificant influence on the produced reliability indices. In [41], a method is
described in which power restoration schemes for specific failures can be
defined in an interactive way.
2.4 Tertiary Failure Effect Analysis
Typical reaction times for tertiary reactions are in the order of minutes to
hours. The objective of the tertiary reactions are to optimize the operational
state which is reached after the secondary reactions have finished. Tertiary
reactions are not considered further in this thesis.
2.5 Stochastic Modeling and Interruption Costs As-
sessment
In order to produce qualitative reliability indices for a power system, we have
to provide both electric system data and component failure data.
With the electric system data and the component failure data, contingencies
can be created, i.e. system states in which one or more failures are present.
A failure effect analysis, including a primary, secondary and tertiary FEA, is
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then performed. The FEA produces a list of interrupted customers and will
also calculate the duration of the interruption for each individual customer.
The duration is a very important aspect of the interruption, and its mean
value can be used, for instance, to calculate the annual interruption proba-
bility, expressed in minutes per year of not being supplied. It depends on
the type of the used failure models if it will also be possible to calculate the
probability distribution of the interruption duration for a specific contingency.
As the failure models use stochastic durations, i.e. stochastic life-times and
repair durations, a repetition of the same contingency under the same con-
ditions will lead to different interruption durations. The interruption duration
is therefore a stochastic quantity.
This is important because the damage caused by an interruption will often
depend largely on the duration of the interruption. If this dependency is not
linear, then it will not be possible to calculate the expected interruption costs
correctly when the probability distribution of the duration is not known.
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Figure 2.4: Utilization of the Weibull-Markov model
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The commonly used failure model in reliability assessment is the so-called
homogenous Markov model. It will be shown in the next chapter that a
correct assessment of the probability distribution of the interruption durations
is not possible with the homogenous Markov model.
Therefore, in order to assess expected interruption costs correctly, a different
stochastic failure model is required that will enable the calculation of duration
distributions. Such an alternative to the homogenous Markov model is the
Weibull-Markov model.
The principle utilization of the Weibull-Markov model for the calculation of
interruption costs is depicted in Fig.2.4. The failure data and the electric
system data are used in a Weibull-Markov system state calculation. This
calculation produces the means of the stochastic interruption durations as
well as discrete probability density functions (PDF). Each interruption dura-
tion PDF is combined with an interruption damage function to produce the
expected interruption costs for a customer, for the currently analyzed contin-
gency. The expected annual customer interruption costs are then calculated
by combining the results of all analyzed contingencies.
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Stochastic models
In order to perform a reliability assessment, we regard the electrical power
system as a collection of components. Each component is a typical part
of the electric power system which is treated as one single object in the
reliability analysis. Examples are a specific load, a line, a generator, etc.,
but also a complete transformer bay with differential protection, breakers,
separators and grounding switches may be treated as a single component
in a reliability assessment.
A component may exhibit different ’component states’, such as ’being avail-
able’, ’being repaired’, etc. In the example of a transformer, the following
states could be distinguished:
1. the transformer performs to its requirements
2. the transformer does not meet all its requirements
3. the transformer is available, but not used
4. the transformer is in maintenance
5. the transformer is in repair
6. the transformer is being replaced by another transformer
7. the transformer behaves in such a way as to trigger its differential relay
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For some reliability calculations, all these possible states may have to be
accounted for. Normally, a reduction is made to two or three states. A two
state model would, for instance, only distinguish between
1. the transformer is available
2. the transformer is not available
A three state model could further distinguish between repairs (“forced out-
ages”) and maintenance (“planned outages”), or between different levels of
availability. Each of these states is described by
• an electrical model with electrical and operational constraints
• a duration distribution
• the possible transitions to the other states
The electric model for a transformer which is not available would be an infi-
nite impedance, for instance. A model for a transformer which is only partly
available would have a stuck tap changer, for instance, or would have a re-
duced capacity.
A stochastic component is a component with two or more states which have
a random duration and for which the next state is selected randomly from
the possible next states. A stochastic component changes abruptly from
one state to another at unforeseen moments in time. If we would monitor
such a stochastic component over a long period of time, while recognizing
four distinct states – x0, x1, x2 and x3 –, a graph as depicted in Fig.3.1 could
be the result.
Because the behavior is stochastic, another graph will appear even if we
would monitor an absolute exact copy of the component under exactly the
same conditions.
For all stochastic models, only the state duration and the next state are
stochastic quantities. Each distinct functional state of a component is there-
fore regarded as being completely deterministic, apart from its duration.
Phenomena like randomly fluctuating impedances or random harmonic dis-
tortions are therefore not part of the stochastic behaviour of a component.
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Figure 3.1: Example of monitored states of a component
If such phenomena are to be included in a reliability assessment, to assess
the number of interruptions due to excessive harmonic distortion for exam-
ple, the stochastic model must be extended by a number of states for which
the fluctuating random quantity is considered constant.
This chapter introduces the stochastic models for electrical power system
components. From these stochastic models, the model for a stochastic
power system are then developed.
3.1 Stochastic Models
The basic quantity in reliability assessment is the duration D for which a
component stays in the same state. This duration is a stochastic quantity,
as its precise value is unknown. The word “precise” is emphasized here, as,
although we don’t know the value of a stochastic quantity, we almost always
know something about the possible values it could have. The time until the
next unplanned trip of a generator, for example, is unknown, but nobody
would expect a good generator to trip every day, as well as nobody would
expect it to operate for 10 years continuously without tripping even once.
This example range from 1 day to 10 years is too wide to be of practical
use in a reliability assessment. However, for actual generators, a much
smaller range of expected values can be obtained from measured data. The
basic question about a stochastic quantity is thus about the range of its
expected values, or ‘outcomes’: which outcomes can be expected and with
what probability?
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Both the outcome range and the outcome probabilities can be described
by a single function; the “Cumulative Distribution Function” or CDF. This
function is also called the “distribution function” and is written as FD(τ) and
defines the probability of D being smaller than τ , which is written as:
FD(τ) = Pr(D ≤ τ) (3.1)
For reliability purposes, the probability for a negative duration is zero and
the probability that the duration will be smaller than infinity is one:
FD(0) = 0 (3.2)
FD(∞) = 1 (3.3)
The “Probability Density Function” or PDF, for D, fD(τ), is the derivative
of the cumulative distribution function. The PDF, also known as “density
function”, gives a first insight into the possible values forD, and the likelihood
of it taking a value in a certain range.
fD(τ) =
d
dτ
FD(τ) (3.4)
fD(τ) = lim
∆τ→0
Pr(τ ≤ D < τ +∆τ)
∆τ
(3.5)∫ ∞
0
fD(τ)dτ = 1.0 (3.6)
The survival function (SF), RD(τ), is defined as the probability that the du-
ration D will be longer than τ .
RD(τ) = Pr(D > τ) = 1− FD(τ) (3.7)
For a specific component, i.e. a transformer, where D is the life time, which
is also known as the time to failure (TTF), the survival function gives the
probability for the component functioning for at least a certain amount of time
without failures. For a group of identical components, the SF is the expected
fraction of components that will ‘survive’ up to a certain time without failures.
The hazard rate function (HRF), hD(τ), is defined as the probability density
for a component to fail shortly after a certain time τ , given the fact that the
component is still functioning at τ ,
hD(τ) = lim
∆τ→0
Pr(τ ≤ D < τ +∆τ | D > τ)
∆τ
=
fD(τ)
RD(τ)
(3.8)
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The HRF is an estimate of the unreliability of the components that are still
functioning without failures after a certain amount of time. An increasing
HRF signals a decreasing reliability. An increasing HRF means that the
probability of failure in the next period of time will increase with age. A
decreasing HRF could, for instance, occur when only the better components
survive.
The expected value of a function g of a stochastic quantity D is defined as
E(g(D)) =
∫ ∞
0
g(τ)fD(τ)dτ (3.9)
The expected value of D itself is its mean ED, which is defined as
ED = E(D) =
∫ ∞
0
τfD(τ)dτ (3.10)
The k’th central moment, MkD, is defined as
MkD = E([D − E(D)]k) (3.11)
The variance VD is defined as the second central moment
VD =M2D = E([D −E(D)]2) = E(D2)− (E(D))2 (3.12)
The standard variance σD is defined as the square of the variance
σD =
√
VD (3.13)
The remainder CDF is defined as the CDF of the remaining duration after
an inspection at time t has revealed that the component had not failed yet.
Because the total duration D is a stochastic quantity, the remainder D− t is
also stochastic. The remainder CDF, GD(τ, t), is defined as
GD(τ, t) = Pr(D ≤ τ | D > t) = Pr(t < D ≤ τ)Pr(t < D)
=
FD(τ)− FD(t)
RD(t)
(3.14)
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3.1.1 The Exponential Distribution
The negative exponential distribution, or simply “exponential distribution”, is
defined by
fD(τ) = λe−λτ (3.15)
which makes that
FD(τ) = 1− e−λτ (3.16)
hD(τ) = λ (3.17)
ED =
1
λ
(3.18)
VD =
1
λ2
(3.19)
The HRF of the negative exponential distribution, hD(τ), is not dependent of
time which considerably simplifies many reliability calculations.
The remainder CDF,GT (τ, t), for the negative exponential distribution equals
GD(τ, t) = 1− e−λ(τ−t) = FD(τ − t) (3.20)
The remainder of an exponential distributed duration thus has the same dis-
tribution as the total duration. The expected value, variance, etc. for the
remainder are all the same as for the total duration, independent of the in-
spection time. This is a peculiarity unique to the exponential distribution. It
also shows that the exponential distribution is very abstract. If, for instance,
a repair duration would be negative exponentially distributed, then the ex-
pected time to finish the repair would be independent of the time already
spend repairing.
The exponential distribution is a good approximation for events that are due
to external circumstances. All failures which are not due to ageing could
be modeled with an exponential distribution for the TTF. The exponential
distribution, however, is not suitable for modeling repair and restoration pro-
cesses.
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3.1.2 The Weibull distribution
Where the exponential distribution uses only one parameter (λ), the Weibull
PDF uses a shape factor β and a scale factor η. It is defined as
fD(τ) =
β
ηβ
τβ−1 exp
[
−
(
τ
η
)β]
(3.21)
which makes that
FD(τ) = 1− exp
[
−
(
τ
η
)β]
(3.22)
hD(τ) =
β
ηβ
τβ−1 (3.23)
ED = ηΓ
(
1 +
1
β
)
(3.24)
VD = η2
{
Γ
(
1 +
2
β
)
−
[
Γ
(
1 +
1
β
)]2}
(3.25)
where
Γ(x) =
∫ ∞
0
tx−1e−tdt
is the normal gamma function.
The Weibull PDF equals the negative exponential distribution when the shape
parameter β = 1.0. Some examples of the Weibull PDF, for different means
and variance are displayed in in Fig.3.2 and Fig.3.3.
The conditional CDF, GT (τ, t), for the Weibull distribution equals
GD(τ, t) = exp
[(
t
η
)β
−
(
τ
η
)β]
(3.26)
which is dependent on the inspection time t.
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Figure 3.2: Weibull PDF for different means, variance = 1.0
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Figure 3.3: Weibull PDF for different variances, mean = 4.0
Weibull Probability Charts
The Weibull survival function can be transformed into a straight line by taking
the double logarithm of the reciprocal of the survival function:
ln(
1
RD(τ)
) =
(
τ
η
)β
(3.27)
ln(ln(
1
RD(τ)
)) = β ln(τ)− β ln(η) (3.28)
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From (3.28), it is clear that a plot of ln(− ln(RD(τ))) against ln(τ) will pro-
duce straight lines. Because the transformation is independent of the shape
and scale parameters, it is possible to draw plotting paper where the verti-
cal axis is logarithmic and corresponds to the survival time τ , and the hor-
izontal axis is transformed to correspond with ln(− ln(1 − FD(τ))). Such
“Weibull-probability charts” are a helpful tool in estimating shape and scale
parameters without the risk of producing completely unrealistic parameters
for measurements which do not fit a single Weibull distribution. Such unre-
alistic parameters would be produced without further warning by numerical
parameter estimation algorithms.
3.1.3 Maintenance, Repair and Failure Density
In many reliability textbooks ([53], [119]), a distinction is made between re-
pairable and non-repairable components. While in many systems the latter
are of great importance, non-repairable components do not exist in electric
power systems or are of no importance. Electric power systems are not
build to perform once or twice, but to perform continuously, 24 hours a day,
365 days per year. Therefore, there is no such thing as a ‘mission time’ for
electric power systems, nor for their components.
When speaking of the repair of a power system component, not the repair of
the actually failed component is meant, but the restoration of the functionality
of the component. Such may be achieved by repairing the component, for
example by repairing a faulted cable, or by replacing it.
A repair can restore the component to a condition as if it was brand new
again. Repair by replacement is the trivial example. Such a perfect repair
is called a repair “as-good-as-new”. If the repair restores the component
to about the same condition in which it was directly before the failure, it is
called a repair “as-bad-as-old”.
If we would take a new component into service and just use it continuously,
without preventive maintenance, it will fail after a certain time. This time is
called the Time To First Failure or TTFF.
May 12, 2003 39
Stochastic models
Many power system components, however, will undergo some scheme of
preventive maintenance. Such maintenance is performed in order to prolong
the lifetime of the component or, in better words, to significantly increase
the mean time between failures. This means that the original stochastic
TTFF of the component can therefore not be measured, as it is obscured by
the maintenance. What is left to be measured is the time between the last
maintenance and the failure, which is called the time to failure (TTF). For a
component without maintenance the TTF equals the time between failures
(TBF). For a component with maintenance, TBF is larger than or equal to
TTF.
To investigate how the original component’s TTFF, and the measurable TTF
and TBF are related, we assume ideal maintenance and ideal repair. Ideal
maintenance is performed at regular equidistant intervals, has no duration,
and restores the component to a state as-good-as-new. Ideal repair also
has no duration, and also makes the component as-good-as-new again.
Suppose that we have a component for which we know the PDF of the time
to failure, i.e. without failure. If we then perform ideal preventive mainte-
nance at fixed intervals TM , we can calculate the new PDF for the time
between failures for the maintained component.
The probability density of the TTFF for the period until the first maintenance,
f1(t), has the same value as the original PDF because maintenance has not
changed anything yet:
f1(t) =
{
fT (t) if 0 < t ≤ TM
0 otherwise
(3.29)
Note that f1(t) is not a PDF, because it only describes the distribution in the
first period and
∫∞
0 f1(t)dt will therefore be smaller than one.
The probability of surviving until t = TM is RT (TM ). This is also the proba-
bility of the component to fail at t > TM if the maintenance would not have
been performed. Because the ideal maintenance has no duration, this re-
maining probability is distributed over all moments t > TM . The shape of the
distribution is again the same as the original because the maintenance is a
repair-as-good-as-new. The probability distribution for the second period will
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therefore be
f2(t) =
{
RT (TM )f1(t− TM ) if TM < t ≤ 2TM
0 otherwise
(3.30)
The general solution is achieved by repeating this for t = kTM with k ∈ N+
(see [53, p.14])
f∗T (t) =
∞∑
k=0
RkT (TM )f1(t− kTM ) (3.31)
Before calling f∗T (t) a probability distribution function, we have to show that∫∞
0 f
∗
T (t) = 1. Using (3.29), we can write∫ TM
0
f∗T (t)dt =
∫ TM
0
fT (t)dt = FT (TM )
and therefore∫ ∞
0
f∗T (t)dt =
∞∑
k=0
RkT (TM )FT (TM )
= FT (TM ) ·
∞∑
k=0
(1− FT (TM ))k
= 1
The function f∗T (t) is thus a correct probability distribution function.
This is an important result, because the geometric expressionRkT (TM ) forces
the PDF to fluctuate between two negative exponential curves. This is some-
times used as an argument in favor of using exponential distributions for the
TTF, as TTF is forced to become ‘more or less’ exponential by the preventive
maintenance.
The effect of ideal maintenance is illustrated here by a small example. A
single component was taken with a Weibull distributed TTFF, with a scale
factor of 1.0 and a shape factor of 4.0. Ideal maintenance was performed
at T = 1, 2, 3, · · · . The distribution of both the TTF and the TBF where
simultaneously obtained from a chronological Monte Carlo simulation which
ran up to 100.000 failures. The resulting distribution for the TTF is depicted
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Figure 3.4: TTFF with ideal maintenance
in Fig.3.4. This figure also shows the original TTFF, which is bell-shaped
with a mean of 0.91. The TTF has a mean of 1.32 and a standard deviation
of 0.97. Maintenance for this component increases the TTF by about 45%.
The resulting distribution of the TBF is depicted in Fig.3.5 This figure shows
high peaks of probability density around multiples of the time between main-
tenance. If we compare Fig.3.5 with Fig.3.4, then we see that where the
distribution of the TTF is zero directly after each maintenance, the distri-
bution of the TBF is almost symmetrical around the maintenance periods.
The distribution of the TBF becomes more clear when we write the times at
which failures occur as t = nT − δ where 0 < δ < T .
From Fig.3.4, we see that failures are more likely to occur for smaller δ. The
TBF is the time between two subsequent failures, and can thus be written
as (n+ k)T − δ1 − nT + δ2 = kT − δ1 + δ2, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · . As δ1 and δ2 are
identically distributed, the distribution of the TBF is symmetrical around kT .
The measured mean of the TBF (i.e. the MTBF) is 1.55.
The Monte-Carlo simulation was repeated for a exponential distributed TTFF
by setting the form factor to 1.0. The resulting distribution of the TBF is
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Figure 3.5: TBF with ideal maintenance
depicted in Fig.3.6. This TBF equals the original TTFF. Maintenance on a
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Figure 3.6: TBF with ideal maintenance, exponential TTFF
component with an exponentially distributed TTFF has no effect.
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3.1.4 Measuring and Modeling TTF
In most cases, only the MTBF is known for a specific class of components,
which is normally calculated as the number of failures divided by the number
of monitored service-years. We cannot directly derive conclusions about the
distribution of the TTF from that. Most utilities, however, keep records of fail-
ure time and performed maintenance. From these records, the distribution of
the TTF could theoretically be derived. This would lead to a right-censored
set of measured TTFF, with which Weibull form factors could be estimated.
Measuring TBF where regular maintenance is performed will lead to more
or less negative exponentially probability density distributions. The conclu-
sion that the component’s TTFF is thus negative exponentially distributed
is, however, wrong. The real distribution of the component’s TTFF may be
completely different. Nevertheless, homogeneous models can still be used
in this case as they correctly model the physical TBF. It must however be
kept in mind that the homogenous model models the combination of the
component’s failure process and the performed preventive maintenance.
Homogenous models can not be used for determining the effects of changed
maintenance planning. This is caused by the fact that when using a homoge-
nously distributed TBF for a component, additionally modeled maintenance
will not affect the failure frequency. The conclusion would then be that ad-
ditional maintenance will only increase the unavailability of the component
(because additional planned unavailability is introduced), and less mainte-
nance is therefore always better. Modeling maintenance in a reliability anal-
ysis where homogenous failure models are used exclusively is still sensible,
as performed maintenance may decrease reliability performance not only
by adding planned unavailability, but also because it introduces periods of
reduced redundancy, and increased numbers of human failures. But again,
all these effects will lower the reliability performance and only the mainte-
nance that was performed during the measurement of the failure data may
be modeled.
When performing a chronological Monte-Carlo simulation with homogenous
failure models and imperfect maintenance in that sense that the mainte-
nance duration is larger than zero, a small but systematic error is introduced.
This error will result in small effects of changed maintenance intervals on the
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failure frequency despite the use of homogenous models. This is caused by
the fact that, during the Monte-Carlo simulation, we have to draw a new TTF
when maintenance is performed. If that new TTF is drawn at the end of the
maintenance, then the failure process will be temporarily switched off, which
will lead to slightly lower average failure frequencies. When the new TTF is
drawn at the start of the maintenance, we would have to disregard all TTF
that are smaller than the maintenance duration, which would also (normally)
lead to slightly lower average failure frequencies. It would be wrong to in-
terpret these changes in failure frequency as a realistic effect of changed
maintenance intervals.
3.2 Homogenous Markov Models
One of the important qualities of the homogenous Markov model shows itself
when we build a stochastic system from stochastic components. When all
stochastic components are homogenous Markov models, then the system
will be a homogenous Markov model also, only much larger.
This enables the calculation of state probability, frequency and duration by
analytic matrix operations. Although this seems to be a great advantage,
this is only partly so. The system state indices which can all be obtained
together by matrix operations can much easier be calculated by summing
the contributions of the system component.
The one exception is the calculation of system state duration distributions.
These can not be calculated from the component models when the compo-
nent life-times and repair durations have arbitrary probability distributions.
However, the system state duration distributions, although easily obtained
for homogenous Markov model, will be unrealistic in that case when preven-
tive maintenance is used.
This is so because the one important disadvantage of the homogenous
Markov model is the exclusive use of the negative exponential distribution for
all stochastic durations in the system. In the case of repair of maintenance
durations, these distributions are already highly unlikely, but in the case of
life time, they cannot be other than incorrect. Using a negative exponen-
tially distributed lifetime will always cause the model to react to preventive
maintenance by a lowered overall availability, which is surely not the case
for normal power system equipment.
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Nevertheless, the homogenous Markov model is very important due to its
computational elegance. A good understanding of the basic properties of
the homogenous Markov model is required for understanding other models
and methods used in power system reliability assessment.
3.2.1 The Homogenous Markov Component
The monitored stochastic behaviour of a component can be described com-
pletely by a set of state and epoch combinations (xn, tn)∞n=0. This is illus-
trated by Fig.3.7 which shows a possible graph of the monitored states of a
component with four distinct states; x0, x1, x2 and x3.
x 0
x 1
x 3
t 0 t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5
x 2
T n
X n
Figure 3.7: Example of monitored states of a component
If we monitor the same component under exactly the same conditions, an-
other set (xn, tn)∞n=0 will be the result, as each next state and each state
duration (tn+1 − tn) are stochastic quantities. Each set (xn, tn)∞n=0 is an
outcome from a infinite number of possible outcomes, and is called a “com-
ponent history”. The stochastic history for the component with index “c”, is
written as “(Xc,nc , Tc,nc)∞nc=0”. Both Xc,nc and Tc,nc are stochastic quantities
and we may talk, for example, about “the probability of Xc,23 = x1” or “the
probability density function of (Tc,45 − Tc,44)”.
The homogenous Markov model is now defined by:
• the set of possible states xc = {1, 2, · · · , Nc} where Nc is the number
of possible states
• the stochastic history (Xc,nc , Tc,nc)∞nc=0, where
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– ∀nc(Xc,nc ∈ xc, Xc,nc 6= Xc,nc+1)
– Tc,0 = 0 and ∀nc(Tc,nc+1 > Tc,nc)
• the set of continuous probability distribution functions Fc,ij(t) for the
conditional state durations Dc,ij
Fc,ij(t) = Pr(Dc,ij ≤ t)
= Pr(Xc,nc = i , (Tc,nc+1 − Tc,nc) ≤ t | Xc,nc+1 = j)
= 1− exp
(
− t
λc,ij
)
From the homogenous Markov model, the stochastic process Xc(t) can be
defined as
Tc,nc ≤ t < Tc,nc+1 ⇒ Xc(t) = Xc,nc (3.32)
The conditional state durations Dc,ij are the stochastic durations for state
i, given the fact that the next state will be j. An outcome of a history is
obtained by drawing outcomes dc,ik for all conditional state durations Dc,ik in
each state, and selecting the smallest value. Then, with j such that dc,ij =
min(dc,ik), Xc,nc+1 = j and Tc,nc+1 = Tc,nc + dc,ij .
The probability distribution for the duration Dc,i of state xc,i is thus the distri-
bution of the minimum of the conditional durations:
Fc,i(t) = Pr(Dc,i ≤ t) = Pr(
Nc
min
j=1
(Dc,ij) ≤ t)
= 1−
Nc∏
j=1
Pr(Dc,ij > t) = 1−
Nc∏
j=1
exp
(
− t
λc,ij
)
= 1− exp
(
− t
λc,i
)
(3.33)
1
λc,i
=
Nc∑
j=1
1
λc,ij
(3.34)
The state duration is thus again exponentially distributed and is character-
ized by the single ‘state transition rate’ λc,i. The state transition rate is ex-
pressed in ‘per time’ units, and may thus be interpreted as a frequency. This
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frequency, however, expresses the number of transitions out of the state per
time spend in the state, and not per total time. The state transition rate thus
only equals the state frequency for components with just one state. For a
component with two identical states, the state frequency will be half the state
transition rate. The expected state duration can be directly calculated from
the state transition rate as
E(Dc,i) =
1
λc,i
(3.35)
For the transition probability Pc(i, j) = Pr(Xc,nc+1 = j | Xc,nc = i) it follows
that
Pc(i, j) = Pr(Dc,ij =
Nc
min
k=1
(Dc,ik))
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr(min
k 6=j
(Dc,ik) ≥ υ) 1
λc,ij
e−υ/λc,ij dυ
=
∫ ∞
0
1
λc,ij
e−υ/λc,i dυ
=
λc,i
λc,ij
(3.36)
Both the state duration distribution and the transition probabilities are thus
independent of time and independent of the history of the system. By
(3.36), a constant transition probability matrix Pc = [Pc(i, j)] is defined for
the Markov model. The fact that the transition probabilities are constant
means that the sequence of states in a history of the component is indepen-
dent of the time spend in those states. This sequence of states, (Xc,nc)∞nc=0,
is called the “embedded Markov chain”. For Markov chains with stationary
transition probabilities the so-called Markov-property holds, which can be
written as
Pr(Xc,nc+m = j | Xc,0 = k,Xc,1 = l, · · · , Xc,nc = i) (3.37)
= Pr(Xc,nc+m = j | Xc,nc = i) = P (m)c (i, j)
where P (m)c (i, j) is the value on the i, j position in the mth power of Pc. For
all P (m)c , ∀i
∑Nc
j=1 P
(m)(i, j) = 1.0.
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The Markov property tells us that the probability to find the component in
a certain state after a certain number of transitions only depends on the
number of transitions and on the starting state.
The homogenous Markov model may be graphically depicted as shown in
Fig.3.8, which shows a Markov Model with three states. Because the state
duration PDF and the transition probabilities can both be calculated from the
transition rates, the only data needed to completely define a homogenous
Markov model is the set of these transition rates λij .
λ 0 1
λ 1 0
λ 2 1λ 1 2
λ 2 0
λ 0 2
S t a t e  0 S t a t e  1
S t a t e  2
Figure 3.8: The homogenous Markov model
Both the transition probabilities and the conditional state durations in a ho-
mogenous Markov model are independent of the history of the system. This
means that when the component is found to change to a certain state at a
certain time, the probabilities for the next states and the distribution of the
duration of the current state, are always known.
By calculating the state duration rates and the state transition probabilities
from the transition rates, an alternative representation of the homogenous
Markov model results. This representation is graphically depicted in Fig.3.9.
Both representations are analogous. The transition rates can be calculated
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from the alternative model data as
λij = Pr
c
(i, j) · λi (3.38)
P(0,1)
P(1,0)
λ
ο
λ1
λ2
State 0 State 1
State 2
Figure 3.9: Alternative representation of the homogenous Markov Model
3.2.2 The Homogenous Markov System
A homogenous Markov system is a stochastic model of a power system for
which all stochastic components are homogenous Markov components. The
homogenous Markov system is nothing more than a combination of those
components.
The homogenous Markov system is defined by
• the number of homogenous Markov components N
• the set of homogenous Markov components
(
(Xc,nc , Tc,nc)∞nc=0
)N
c=1
• the resulting stochastic system history (Sns , Tns)∞ns=0, where
– Sns = (X1,ns , X2,ns , · · · , XN,ns) and Xc,ns = Xc(Tns)
– (Tns)∞ns=0 =
⋃N
c=1(Tc,nc)
∞
n=0
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The system state S(t) at any time t is thus the vector of component states
Xc(t) at that time. Because the number of possible states is limited for all
components, the system state space is also limited. However, because the
stochastic components are assumed to be stochastically independent, the
number of possible system states is the product of the number of possible
component states. For a moderate system of 100 components, each of
which has two states, the size of the system state space is 2100 possible
states.
The system changes state when at least one of its component changes its
state. However, because all components are assumed to be stochastically
independent, the probability of two of them changing state at the very same
moment is zero:
¬∃a,b,na,nb(Ta,na = Tb,nb) (3.39)
For each system epoch Tns , there is thus exactly one component with the
same epoch,
∀ns∃1c∃nc(Tns = Tc,nc) (3.40)
The system thus changes state because one component changes state, and
that component is therefore called the “causing component”. Each system
state Sns has a single causing component. Two succeeding system states
may have the same causing component.
For a system which changes to state Sns at time Tns , the remaining state
duration for component c is defined as
Dc(ns) = Tc,nsc+1 − Tns (3.41)
nsc = sup{nc ∈ N+ | Tc,nc ≤ Tns} (3.42)
and the age of the component state as
Ac(ns) = Tns − Tc,nsc (3.43)
These basic relations are illustrated by Fig.3.10.
The age of a component state is the time it has already spend in its current
state at the start of a new system state, and the remaining duration is the
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Figure 3.10: Component Age and Remaining Duration
time for which it will continue to stay in that state. The duration of the system
state is the minimum of all remaining component state durations. According
to (3.34), the state durations for the homogenous component are negative
exponentially distributed. Because the conditional density function of a ex-
ponentially distributed duration for all inspection times equals the original
distribution, the distribution of the remaining state duration is independent of
the age of the state and equals the total component state duration distribu-
tion. Therefore,
FDc(ns)(t) = 1− exp
(
− t
λnsc
)
(3.44)
where λnsc is the state transition rate for the state Xc,nsc .
Because the system state duration is the minimum of the remaining com-
ponent durations, the distribution of the system state duration can be calcu-
lated as:
FDns (t) = Pr(Dns < t) = Pr(min(Dc(ns)) ≤ t)
= 1− exp
(
− t
λns
)
(3.45)
1
λns
=
N∑
c=1
1
λnsc
(3.46)
where Dns = Tns+1 − Tns is a stochastic system state duration.
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From (3.45), it is clear that all system state durations are negative exponen-
tially distributed. Because the minimum outcome for the remaining state du-
rations for all components also determines the next system state, the same
expressions as used in (3.36) can be used to show that the system state
transition probabilities are independent of time. The conclusion is that the
homogenous Markov system is itself again a homogenous Markov model.
This is the most important quality of the homogenous Markov model.
S t a t e
0 1
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Figure 3.11: A homogenous Markov system
An example of a homogenous system is graphically depicted in Fig.3.11.
This example system consists of two components, one with three and one
with two states. The horizontal transitions in this picture are caused by a
change of the two-state component, the other transitions are caused by the
three-state component. From (3.44), it follows that the transition rates of
the Markov system equal the corresponding component transition rates. In
Fig.3.11, the transition rates of the three state component are shown. If the
three state component would be the one shown in Fig.3.8, then the transition
rates shown in Fig.3.11 and Fig.3.8 would be the same.
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3.2.3 Device of Stages
As we will see later, we will need the distribution of system state durations
in order to calculate some reliability worth indices correctly. The homoge-
nous Markov model makes it possible to quickly calculate this for any system
state, because all components use negative exponential distributions exclu-
sively. The system state duration is therefore also distributed according to a
negative exponential distributions, according to (3.45) and (3.46).
The exponential distribution, however, is not used because it is a good model
for the component state durations, but only because it simplifies the calcu-
lations. The distribution of the Markov system therefore has no relation to
the actual state duration distribution. It cannot be used for that reason to
calculate reliability worth indices.
The alternative to using homogenous Markov models is to use non-homoge-
nous models. The problem with these models, however, is that it is normally
very hard, if not impossible, to calculate a system state duration distribution.
The Weibull-Markov model, which will be introduced in the next chapters,
forms an exception to this rule.
For non-homogenous models, it is commonly tried to convert the model into
a Markovian model, preferably a homogenous one. One of the possible
ways for such conversion is the method of the device of stages. Because
this method is considered a general solution for the case of having non-
homogenous component models, it is introduced here. It will be shown,
however, that this method is not a solution to the problem of assessing inter-
ruption costs.
The method of the device of stages represents each state which has a non-
exponential duration distribution by a combination of ‘virtual’ states that are
exponentially distributed. The series and/or parallel combinations and the
transitions rates of those virtual states are chosen so as to make the duration
distribution of the transitions through the group of virtual states as good
an approximation as possible of the original non-exponential distribution.
The representation of a single non-exponential state by a combination of
exponential states is illustrated by Fig.3.12, for a two-state component. The
state “1” of this component is non-exponential and is therefore converted
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to a series-parallel combination of 5 exponentially distributed states. The
transition rates for these 5 virtual states should now be chosen so that the
distribution of the duration between entering state “a” or “c” and leaving state
“e” should equal, or approximate, the duration distribution of state “1”.
0 1
a
0
b
c d
e
Figure 3.12: Example of a device of stages
The method of the device of stages can be used to calculate time depen-
dent state probabilities, and may thus be used for addressing ageing effects,
effects of preventive maintenance, or other time-dependent behaviour of the
component. However, it is not a solution to the problem of calculating sys-
tem state duration distributions. This is best illustrated by an example. In
Fig.3.13, a system with two components is depicted, each of which has two
states. Assumed is that the UP state of these components (“0” and “a”) are
negative-exponentially distributed, but the DOWN states (“1” and “b”) are
Weibull distributed. The system is supposed to function when at least one
component is in the UP state. The question therefore is to find an expres-
sion of the distribution of the system down time, which is the distribution of
the duration of system state “1b”, which is shown in grey in Fig.3.13.
0 a 1 a
0 b 1 b
0 a
0 b
0 a 1 a
0
1
a
b
Figure 3.13: System with two two-state components
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Even for this very simple system, the expression for the system down time
distribution is not simple because it is the distribution of the minimum of a
Weibull distribution with the remaining distribution of another Weibull distri-
bution, for which the age is unknown.
In Fig.3.14, the two down states of the two components have been converted
to a series of two and three virtual states: ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’. The resulting
system now has 12 possible states, of which 6 are down states. The sys-
tem has now become homogenous Markovian, and for each of the states
in Fig.3.14, the duration is negative exponentially distributed. However, in
order to develop an expression of the duration distribution of the combina-
tion of the six system down states, we would have to account not only for
the six states, but also for every way in which the system could change from
an up state to a down state and back again, and for every possible route
between entering and leaving the part of the state space with down states.
For a combination of a number of virtual states in series, or a number of
virtual states in parallel, such overall distributions can be found. For more
complex virtual state spaces, such as the one in Fig.3.14, no general way of
calculating the overall duration distribution was found in literature.
0 a 1 a 2 a
0 b 1 b 2 b
0 c 1 c 2 c
0 d 1 d 2 d
0 a
0 b
0 c
0 d
0 a 1 a 2 a
a
b
c
d
0
1
2
Figure 3.14: Converted components and resulting system
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The “device of stage” method therefore offers no solution to the problem of
finding the system state duration distribution.
3.3 Weibull-Markov Models
The Weibull-Markov model is a non-homogenous Markov model. Although
the mathematics involved in defining and using the Weibull-Markov model
are somewhat more complex than those used for the homogenous Markov
model, it will be shown that this model lends itself for all types of reliability
calculations possible with the homogenous Markov model, and yet enables
a correct analytical calculation of interruption costs.
The definition of the Weibull-Markov component starts by altering the ho-
mogenous component by using not a negative exponential distribution, but
a Weibull distribution for the conditional state durations. The result is a
stochastic component, defined by
• the set of possible states xc = {1, 2, · · · , Nc} where Nc is the number
of possible states
• the stochastic history (Xc,nc , Tc,nc)∞nc=0, where
– ∀nc(Xc,nc ∈ xc, Xc,nc 6= Xc,nc+1)
– Tc,0 = 0 and ∀nc(Tc,nc+1 > Tc,nc)
• the stochastic process Xc(t) = Xc,nc for Tc,nc ≤ t < Tc,nc+1
• the set of continuous probability distribution functions Fc(t) for the con-
ditional state durations Dc,ij
Fc,ij(t) = Pr(Dc,ij ≤ t)
= Pr(Xc,nc = i , (Tc,n+1 − Tc,nc) ≤ t | Xc,n+1 = j)
= 1− exp
(
−
(
t
ηc,ij
)βc,ij)
This model with Weibull distributions, which has independent duration dis-
tributions defined for each transition separately, equals the homogenous
Markov model when all shape factors βc,ij equal one.
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The above model is mathematically problematic in the sense that it it is even
hard to derive a useful expression for the component state duration dis-
tribution. As with the homogenous model, the next state and the current
state duration are determined by drawing outcomes for all conditional state
durations and selecting the lowest one. The probability distribution for the
duration Dc,i of state xc,i is therefore the distribution of the minimum of the
conditional durations:
Fc,i(t) = Pr(Dc,i ≤ t) = Pr(
Nc
min
j=1
(Dc,ij) ≤ t)
= 1−
Nc∏
j=1
Pr(Dc,ij > t) = 1−
Nc∏
j=1
exp
(
−
(
t
ηc,ij
)βc,ij)
= 1− exp
 Nc∑
j=1
−
(
t
ηc,ij
)βc,ij (3.47)
Expression (3.47) can be simplified drastically by taking a same shape factor
for all conditional state durations in a same state:
βc,ij = βc,i (3.48)
For such “same shape” models,
Fc,i(t) = 1− exp
((
− t
ηc,i
)βc,i)
(3.49)
(
1
ηc,i
)βc,i
=
Nc∑
i=1
(
1
ηc,ij
)βc,i
(3.50)
The state duration for a “same-shape” Weibull distributed component is thus
again Weibull distributed with the scale factor given by (3.50). The stochas-
tic component as defined above, together with (3.48) is called a “Weibull-
Markov” component.
With the expression for the state duration distribution, the transition proba-
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bility matrix for the Weibull-Markov component can be derived as
Pc(i, j) = Pr(Dc,ij =
Nc
min
k=1
(Dc,ik))
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr(min
k 6=j
(Dc,ik) ≥ υ) βc,iυ
βc,i−1
ηβc,ic,ij
e−(υ/ηc,ij)
βc,i
dυ
=
∫ ∞
0
βc,iυ
βc,i−1
ηβc,ic,ij
e−(υ/ηc,i)
βc,i
dυ
=
ηc,i
ηc,ij
(3.51)
The transition probabilities for the Weibull-Markov component are thus in-
dependent of time and independent of the history of the component. The
Weibull-Markov model is thus a semi-Markov model. With the stationary
transition probabilities, it is clear that Xc,nc is again an embedded Markov-
chain for which
Pr(Xc,nc+m = j | Xc,0 = k,Xc,1 = l, · · · , Xc,nc = i)
= Pr(Xc,nc+m = j | Xc,nc = i) = P (m)c (i, j)
where P (m)c (i, j) is the value on the i, j position in the mth power of Pc. For
all P (m)c , ∀i
∑Nc
j=1 P
(m)(i, j) = 1.0.
Expressions (3.50) and (3.51) are equivalent to their homogenous counter-
parts (3.36) and (3.34). A graphical representation of the Weibull-Markov
component is shown in Fig.3.15.
The definition and basic equations of the Weibull-Markov model look very
much alike those of the homogenous Markov model, except for the addi-
tional distribution shape parameter β. The requirement that the new model
should be compatible with the homogenous Markov model is met: all ho-
mogenous Markov models can be transformed into Weibull-Markov models
without a need for new reliability data, by using β = 1 in all states. Existing
measurements of component reliability can be used at any convenient time
to calculate more realistic shape factors. It is possible to gradually substitute
homogenous data by more realistic Weibull-Markov data.
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Figure 3.15: The Weibull-Markov Model
3.3.1 Component State Probability and Frequency
The fact that the Weibull-Markov model is fully compatible with the homoge-
nous Markov model is very important. Even more important is the require-
ment that it should be possible to analyze Weibull-Markov components by
fast and exact methods. These component analyses are needed to calculate
component state probabilities and frequencies, which are needed to speed
up a system analysis. The assessment of system reliability indices does not
ask for ‘solving’ a large Weibull-Markov model. As will be shown, a system
build from Weibull-Markov models is very hard to analyze as a whole with
analytic methods. However, by ‘pre-processing’ the components, the system
properties can be assessed by adding the contributions of the components.
The state probabilities and frequencies of a Weibull-Markov component can
be calculated by first regarding the embedded Markov chain. For any Weibull-
Markov model, leaving out the component index, the chain state probability
vector is defined as
Qn = [Pr(Xn = 1),Pr(Xn = 2), · · · ,Pr(Xn = Nc)] (3.52)
The chain state probability vector can be calculated from the initial state
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probability after n state transitions as
Qn = P (n) ·Q0 (3.53)
where
P = [P (i, j)] =

P (1, 1) P (1, 2) P (1, 3) · · · P (1, N)
P (2, 1) P (2, 2) P (2, 3) · · ·
.
.
.
.
.
.
P (N, 1) · · · P (N,N)

and P (i, j) = Pr(Xn+1 = j | Xn = i)
In [119] it is shown that for a Markov chain with stationary transition proba-
bilities, the long term state probabilities can be found by solving
Q = P ·Q (3.54)
where
Q = [Q(1), Q(2), · · · , Q(N)] = lim
n→∞Qn (3.55)
With the Weibull-Markov component, there are no self-transitions, and there-
fore ∀i(P (i, i) = 0). The long term Markov chain state probabilities can be
solved by using
∀i
 Nc∑
j=1
P (i, j) = 1.0
 (3.56)
Nc∑
i=1
Q(i) = 1.0 (3.57)
and by taking
Aij =
{
P (i,N) + 1 if i = j
P (i, n)− P (i, j) if i 6= j
bi = P (i,N)
Q′ = [Q(1), Q(2), · · · , Q(N − 1)]
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A solution for Q′ can then be found by solving
A ·Q′ = b (3.58)
and Q(N) is found by using (3.57) again.
The state probabilities for the Weibull-Markov component can be calculated
from the embedded state probabilities as
Pr(i) =
Q(i) ∗ E(Di)∑N
i=1Q(i) ∗ E(Di)
(3.59)
where E(Di) = ηiΓ
(
1 + 1βi
)
is the expected duration of state i.
With the known Weibull-Markov state probabilities Pr(i), the state frequen-
cies Fr(i) can be calculated as
Fr(i) =
Pr(i)
E(Di)
3.4 The Weibull-Markov System
The Weibull-Markov system is defined in the same way as the homoge-
nous Markov system; as a stochastic model of a power system for which all
stochastic components are Weibull-Markov components.
The Weibull-Markov system is thus defined by
• the number of Weibull-Markov components N
• the set of Weibull-Markov components
(
(Xc,nc , Tc,nc)∞nc=0
)N
c=1
• the resulting stochastic system history (Sns , Tns)∞ns=0, where
– Sns = (X1,ns , X2,ns , · · · , XN,ns) and Xc,ns = Xc(Tns)
– (Tns)∞ns=0 =
⋃N
c=1(Tc,nc)
∞
n=0
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Except for the different component state duration distributions, the Weibull-
Markov system behaves in the same way as the homo/-genous Markov sys-
tem. Again, the probability of two components changing state at the very
same moment is zero:
¬∃a,b,na,nb(Ta,na = Tb,nb) (3.60)
and thus
∀ns∃1c∃nc(Tns = Tc,nc) (3.61)
Identical definitions for the remaining state duration and the age of the com-
ponents c for all system states are used.
Dc(ns) = Tc,nsc+1 − Tns (3.62)
nsc = sup{nc ∈ N+ | Tc,nc ≤ Tns} (3.63)
Ac(ns) = Tns − Tc,nsc (3.64)
However, where the distribution of the remaining duration of the state of a ho-
mogenous component equals the distribution of the complete duration, this
is generally not the case for a Weibull-Markov component. For a Weibull-
Markov component, the distribution of the remaining duration normally de-
pends on the history of the system. As the system state duration is the mini-
mum of the remaining component state durations, this dependency makes it
very hard, if not impossible, to derive exact expressions for the system state
duration distribution as a whole. Even more important is that also the proba-
bilities for the following system state become history dependent, as they are
too determined by the smallest outcome of the remaining component state
durations.
From this it is clear that the Weibull-Markov system is not only a non-homo/-
genous model, but even not a Markov model. It will however be shown that
the Weibull-Markov system will becomes a semi-Markov system again when
it is assumed to be stationary.
3.4.1 Weibull-Markov System State Probability and Frequency
The Weibull-Markov model can only be an alternative to the homogenous
Markov model if it is possible to calculate state probabilities and frequencies
analytically with comparable computational efforts.
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The probability for a system state s is defined as the probability to find the
system in that state at time t and is written as Pr(s, t) = Pr(S(t) = s). For
any moment in time:
Ns∑
s=1
Pr(S(t) = s) = 1 (3.65)
where Ns is the number of possible system states.
As all component are assumed to be statistically independent, the system
state probability is the product of the component state probabilities:
Pr(s, t) =
N∏
c=1
Pr(Xc(t) = xc) (3.66)
The frequency of a system state s is defined as the density of the number
of transitions into the system state per unit of time, for a certain moment in
time.
Fr(s, t) = lim∆t→0
E(number of transitions to s in[t, t+∆t])
∆t
(3.67)
If we write a system with only two components as S2, the upper index being
the number of components, then the frequency of the system state s2 =
(x1, x2) at t is the frequency ofX1(t) = x1 times the probability ofX2(t) = x2,
plus the frequency of X2(t) = x2 times the probability of X1(t) = x1.
Pr(s2, t) = Pr(x1, t) · Pr(x2, t) (3.68)
Fr(s2, t) = Fr(x1, t) · Pr(x2, t) + Fr(x2, t) · Pr(x1, t) (3.69)
This can be repeated for a third component and the two-component system:
Pr(s3, t) = Pr(s2, t) · Pr(x3, t) (3.70)
Fr(s3, t) = Fr(s2, t) · Pr(x3, t) + Fr(x3, t) · Pr(s2, t) (3.71)
and, by induction, for the whole system:
Pr(s, t) = Pr(sN−1, t) · Pr(xN , t) (3.72)
Fr(s, t) = Fr(sN−1, t) · Pr(xN , t) + Fr(xN , t) · Pr(sN−1, t) (3.73)
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These recursive equations for probability and frequency are independent of
the state duration distributions. The recursive equation for the system state
frequency can be rewritten into
Fr(s, t) =
N∑
c=1
Fr(xc, t) · N∏
d=1,d 6=c
Pr(xd, t)
 (3.74)
or into
Fr(s, t) = Pr(s, t) ·
N∑
c=1
Fr(xc, t)
Pr(xc, t)
(3.75)
The equality (3.74) is known as the state frequency balance.
For the stationary system, for t → ∞, the component state probabilities
and frequencies become time independent and are written as Pr(xc) and
Fr(xc). The system state probability and frequency will then also become
time independent as
Pr(s) = lim
t→∞Pr(s, t) =
N∏
c=1
Pr(xc) (3.76)
Fr(s) = lim
t→∞Fr(s(t)) = Pr(s) ·
N∑
c=1
Fr(xc)
Pr(xc)
(3.77)
For the stationary system, the expected state duration, or ‘state expectancy’,
in units per time per unit of time, equals the state probability. The expected
system state duration is then calculated by dividing the system state ex-
pectancy by the system state frequency:
E(Ds) = Pr(s)/Fr(s) (3.78)
In most reliability assessment calculations, the unit of frequency is taken as
1/a, where a = annum = 8760 hours, and the expectancy is expressed in
hours. In that case,
E(Ds) = Pr(s) · 8760/Fr(s) hours (3.79)
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3.4.2 Weibull-Markov System State Duration Distribution
For homogenous systems, the system state duration distribution is found
without problems. Because the system too is a homogenous Markov model,
the system state duration will be distributed according to a negative expo-
nential distribution, with a duration rate which is the reciprocal sum of all
corresponding component transition rates.
To find an expression for the state duration distribution of a Weibull-Markov
system, it is important that we consider stationary systems only. This means
that all component models in the system are stationary, and the history for
each component beyond the last state change is irrelevant.
Suppose a stationary system with two components. If we would monitor
such a system for a short period, a graph as depicted in Fig.3.16 could be
the result. It is now possible to regard the epochs of the one component as
1
2
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Figure 3.16: Epochs and inspection times for a two-component system
inspection times for the other, and vice versa, as is depicted in Fig.3.16. As
long as each system state is treated separately, and because both compo-
nents are stationary and stochastically independent, each separate epoch
of the one is a random inspection time for the other.
The derivation of the expression for the system state duration distribution
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starts with a well known result from renewal theory, according to which a
component Xc, when found in state i at a random inspection time τ , has a
remaining state duration distribution according to
Pr(Dc,i − τ < D | Dc,i > τ) = 1
Mc,i
∫ D
0
[1− Fc,i(t)]dt (3.80)
where Mc,i is the mean duration of Xc = i and Fc,i(t) = Pr(Dc,i < t).
By using the random epochs of the one component as an inspection time
for the other, the remaining state duration D1(nj) and D2(ni) in Fig.3.16 will
thus respect (3.80).
According to (3.80), the distribution of the remaining state duration is inde-
pendent of the passed state duration, Dc,i − τ , at the moment of inspection
τ , for all types of distributions for the total state duration Fc,i(t). From this,
it follows that the probability of Xc, when found in state i at time τ , to not
change state in the interval τ ≤ t ≤ τ +D is
Pr(Xc(τ +D) = i | Xc(τ) = i) = 1
Mc,i
∫ ∞
D
[1− Fc,i(t)]dt (3.81)
Because a system will change as soon as one of its components changes,
the probability of a system, consisting of N components, which is found in
state s at time τ , with Tns < τ < Tns+1, to not change state in the interval
τ ≤ t ≤ τ +D is
Pr(S(τ +D) = s | S(τ) = s) =
N∏
c=1
1
Mc,ns
∫ ∞
D
[1− Fc,ns(t)]dt (3.82)
where Mc,ns is the mean duration of Xc,ns and Fc,ns(t) = Pr(Dc(ns) < t).
Expression (3.82) is an important first result, because it shows that it is
possible to express the remaining system state duration distribution in terms
of component state properties. However, we do not want to calculate the
distribution of the remaining system state duration for arbitrary inspection
times, but the distribution for the whole state duration. The inspection time in
(3.82) then equals the moment at which the system state starts, which is the
moment at which the causing component changes its state. The distribution
May 12, 2003 67
Stochastic models
of the ‘remaining’ state duration for that one component will thus equal the
distribution of the total state duration. For all other components, we have
to use (3.81), as they have already spend some time in their state at the
moment the new system state starts.
If we suppose that component Xc is the causing component for system state
Sns , then it follows that he probability of that system state, when its starts at
epoch Tn because component Xc changed state at Tn, to last longer than
D, is
Pr(S(Tns +D) = Sns | Xc,ns 6= Xc,ns−1) =
= [1− Fc,ns(D)]
N∏
k 6=c
(
1
Mk,ns
∫ ∞
D
[1− Fk,ns(t)]dt
)
(3.83)
All that is left now to do is to find an expression for the probability for each
component to be the causing component for system state Sns . Equation
(3.83) can then be weighted by that probability and the distribution of the
system state duration can then be found by summing the weighted expres-
sions for each component.
The probability that Xc is the causing component of system state S is the
fraction of occurrences of that system state which happen due to a change
of Xc. That fraction of occurrences is the relative system state frequency
due to Xc, which is written as Frs(Xc). If s = (x1,s, · · · , xc,i, · · · , xN,s), then
s can be reached by any transition of component Xc from xc,j 6=i to xc,i. Pos-
sible previous states of s are therefore all (x1,s, · · · , xc,j 6=i, · · · , xN,s). This is
depicted in Fig.3.17.
For each of the transitions shown in Fig.3.17, the absolute transition fre-
quency equals
Fr(Xc,ns−1 = j | Xc,ns = i) = Frc(j, i) ·
N∏
k 6=c
Pr(xk,s) (3.84)
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Figure 3.17: Transitions due to changing Xc
and the total transition frequency for any of these states to S thus equals
Fr(Xc,ns−1 6= i | Xc,ns = i) =
Nc∑
j 6=i
Fr(Xc,ns−1 = j | Xc,ns = i)
= Frc,i
N∏
k 6=c
Pr(xk,s) (3.85)
For (3.85), it was used that Frc,i = ∑Ncj 6=i Frc(j, i), which expresses the fact
that a component state frequency is the sum of the absolute transition fre-
quencies into that state.
With (3.85), the probability that Xc causes S is now expressed as
Pr(Xc,ns−1 6= Xc,ns) =
Fr(xc,s)
∏N
k 6=c Pr(xk,s)∑N
c=1
(
Fr(xc,s)
∏N
k 6=c Pr(xk,s)
) (3.86)
=
Fr(xc,s)/Pr(xc,s))∑N
c=1 Fr(xc,s)/Pr(xc,s)
(3.87)
which results in
Pr(Xc,ns−1 6= Xc,ns) =
1/Mc,s∑N
c=1 1/Mc,s
(3.88)
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For a Weibull-Markov system, (3.83) takes the form of
Pr(S(Tns +D) = Sns | Xc,ns 6= Xc,ns−1)
= e−

D
ηc,s
βc,s N∏
k 6=c
1
Mk,s
∫ ∞
k
e
−( t
ηk,s
)
βk,s
dt (3.89)
= e−

D
ηc,s
βc,s C∏
k 6=c
ηk,s
Mk,sβk,s
[
Γ
(
1
βk,s
)
− Γ
(
1
βk,s
, (
D
ηk,s
)
βk,s
)]
(3.90)
where Γ(x, y) denotes the incomplete gamma function for x from 0 to y.
The combination of (3.88) and (3.90) leads to the following expression for
the probability for the duration of system state S to last longer than D:
Pr(Tns+1 − Tns > D) =
N∑
c=1
(Pr(Xc,ns−1 6= Xc,ns) · Pr(S(Tns +D) = Sns | Xc,ns 6= Xc,ns−1))
=
∏N
c=1 γc,s(D)/Mc,s∑N
c=1 1/Mc,s
N∑
c=1
exp
(
−(D/ηc,s)βc,s
)
γc,s(D)
(3.91)
where
γc,i(D) =
ηc,i
βc,i
[
Γ
(
1
βc,i
)
− Γ
(
1
βc,i
,
(
D
ηc,i
)βc,i)]
(3.92)
From equation 3.91 and 3.92, it is clear that the system state duration dis-
tribution is independent of the previous system states in the steady state
case. The γc,i(D) function only depends on the component state duration
distribution parameters β and η. The γc,i(D) values for each component can
thus be calculated prior to the actual reliability assessment.
3.5 Basic Power System Components
This chapter shows a possible implementation of a Weibull-Markov model
for modeling stochastic power system components. The proposed methods
are introduced on the basis of a model for the synchronous generator.
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3.5.1 Defining a Weibull-Markov Model
The Weibull-Markov model is determined by the following set of parameters.
• N, the number of states
• {βi}, the set of form-factors, one for each state
• {ηi}, the set of characteristic times, one for each state
• P, the transition probability matrix
• Electrical parameters, which define the electrical model for the com-
ponent for each state
It is however possible to enter the state duration parameters other than by β
and η, as in many cases, these are unknown. Alternatively,
• {µi}, the mean state durations
• {σi}, the state duration variances
should be possible too.
Any two of the resulting possible state duration parameters, βi, ηi, µi, σi, will
determine the other two. The following conversion formulas can be used:
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µ(β, η) = ηΓ1(β)
µ(β, σ) = Γ1(β)
√
σ2
Γ2(β)
σ(β, η) =
√
η2Γ2(β)
σ(β, µ) =
µ
√
Γ2(β)
Γ1(β)
β(η, µ) = Γinv1
(
µ
η
)
β(η, σ) = Γinv2
(
µ
η
)
β(µ, σ) = Γinv3
(
µ2
η2
)
η(β, µ) =
µ
Γ1(β)
η(β, σ) =
√
σ2
Γ2(β)
where
Γ1(β) = λΓ(1 +
1
β
)
Γ2(β) = Γ(1 +
2
β
)− Γ(1 + 1
β
)2
Γ3(β) =
Γ1(β)2
Γ2(β)
The inversion of Γ1(β), Γ2(β) and Γ3(β) can be performed by newton meth-
ods. De values for µ(η, σ), σ(η, µ) and η(µ, σ) can be calculated by first
calculating the corresponding β.
The above set of conversion formulas enables an easy definition of a Weibull-
Markov model. However, it is also possible to leave all form-factors {βi} to
72 May 12, 2003
Stochastic models
their default values of one, and enter the Weibull-Markov model as a ho-
mogenous Markov model. Such would be needed if no other than homoge-
nous model data is available. In stead of {βi}, {ηi} and P, the homogenous
Markov model requires the input of:
• {λij}, the matrix of state transition rates
This asks for the conversion of the state transition matrix to the transition
probability matrix P. Such conversion can be done by using (3.36).
The back transformation from the state probability matrix to a state transi-
tion matrix can be performed by using the calculated state duration means
and (3.38). This back transformation makes it possible to switch between
‘homogenous input mode’ and ‘Weibull-Markov input mode’, which may be
used to check the validity of the model or to check the correct transformation
of a homogenous model into a more realistic Weibull-Markov model.
3.5.2 A Generator Model
The basic stochastic generator model is fairly primitive, as it only defines
states for the generator being available or not available. In many applica-
tions, such a two-state model is sufficient. However, there are several rea-
sons to include more states to account for partial outages of the generator.
Such a partial outage is a condition in which the generator is still connected
to the net and is still producing power, but in which the maximum output is
limited. Such a situation may occur when
• A run-of-the-river hydro turbine is reduced in capacity due to a low river
level.
• A large, multi-machine thermal power plant is reduced in capacity due
to the outage of one or more generator units.
• The available power is reduced due to the outage of a sub-component,
such as a pulverizer, a fan, a feed water or cooling water pump, etc.
A state that models a partial outage is called a “derated state”. In order
to account for derated states, which number may differ from generator to
generator, it must be possible to freely define new states.
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The implementation of the dialog which is used to define a stochastic gener-
ator is shown in Fig.3.18. This example shows a generator with two derated
states which has been defined as a Weibull-Markov model after which the
dialog was changed to the homogenous Markov mode. It therefore shows
the transition rate matrix and it would be possible to edit this matrix. This
might be useful when stochastic data is available in several different formats,
which are all to be translated into state transition rate models. The entry for
the “dependent state” in the figure is needed to calculate the remaining tran-
sition probability, in order to make sure that the transition probabilities add
up to one for each state.
Figure 3.18: The stochastic model for a synchronous generator
The electrical models for the different states of the synchronous generator
only differ in the maximum available active power and in the number of avail-
able machines. The latter is only of importance when the stochastic model
is used for a multi-machine power plant. The dialog for defining the electrical
model is shown in Fig.3.19.
Because the Weibull-Markov model allows for defining the shape of the state
duration distribution, the dialog has ‘graph’ page, which is shown in Fig.3.20.
This page shows the duration distribution and a set of state parameters,
74 May 12, 2003
Stochastic models
Figure 3.19: Electrical parameters for the stochastic generator
such as the frequency and the MTBS (mean time between states). The
state parameters are calculated from the entered model and are shown for
reference and checking purposes. The shown graph page shows the distri-
bution and state parameters for the ‘out of service’ state. The state probabil-
ity informs the user that this generator is out of service for more than 10% of
time (942.1851 h/a), from which he may decide to check the stochastic data
used.
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Figure 3.20: State duration graph and state parameters
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Chapter 4
Interruption Costs
Assessment
4.1 Reliability Worth
Power system utilities try to maximize efficiency. They have to find the best
balance between performance and cost. Regarding the reliability of sup-
ply, they have to avoid too low a level of investments, because that will re-
sult in excessive damage caused by supply interruptions, as well as over-
investments.
The highest level of efficiency can only be reached by comparing the in-
crease of performance with the required investment costs. The calculation
of (expected) performance indicators in respect to supply reliability is the
task of the reliability assessment. This task can be divided into the calcu-
lation of non-monetary interruption statistics and the calculation of reliability
worth indices. Reliability worth assessment produces monetary indices, and
is a relatively young discipline. The calculation of non-monetary interruption
statistics is more established ([2], [3], [4], [12], [13], [16], [53]). This includes
the calculation of
• Interruption frequency.
• Mean interruption duration.
• Probability of not being supplied.
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• Energy not supplied and mean interrupted power.
Two major problems arise if we use interruption statistics for investment jus-
tification or for estimating the (relative) importance of the various parts of the
system.
The first problem is the fact that we cannot directly compare the costs of in-
creased reliability, which is in monetary units, with a non-monetary reliability
performance index. Non-monetary reliability indices can be used to estab-
lish minimum system requirements or to rank different design alternatives.
But they cannot be related to the investment costs.
The second problem is that the interruption statistics express the supply
reliability from the system’s point of view, i.e. they express the system per-
formance within the context of the system alone. The supplied customers
are only regarded as far as their electrical effects on the system. Customers
with identical electrical behaviour are treated equally. It is therefore difficult,
if not impossible, to account for the effects of specific customer importance
or interruption damage functions in the calculated interruption statistics. In
other words, if the power consumption and the frequency and mean dura-
tion of the power interruptions are identical for a hospital, for instance, and a
shopping mall, then their calculated interruption statistics will also be iden-
tical. It will not be possible to bias the non-monetary reliability performance
indices for the difference in importance of these two loads, even when that
importance is known to be completely different.
One possible way to accommodate for customer importance is to use the
costs for the energy not supplied (money/kWh) and/or a cost per interrupted
power (money/kW) as an adjustable measure for interruption severity. This
can produce useful indices, but it is often insufficient for more detailed plan-
ning or selection of alternatives. This linearization of the costs with the dura-
tion of the interruption does not consider the fast increase with duration that
occurs for individuals as well as for aggregated loads ([124]).
For investment justification or for comparing different design alternatives on
a monetary basis or on the basis of interruption severity, we will have to
consider a more detailed interruption damage model.
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4.2 Interruption Damage Functions
The assessed severity of the impact of a supply interruption, either planned
or unplanned, depends on many aspects. The major factors are the def-
inition of the severity that is used, the type of interrupted customers, the
duration of the interruption and the extent of the interrupted area.
The consequences of an interruption are quantified by a so-called “interrup-
tion damage function”, which gives the consequences in monetary units as
a function of the characteristics of the interruption.
The interruption damage function for a single point interruption and for multi-
point interruptions, for example for large area interruptions, can be modeled
in the same way. Single point damage models describe the interruption
damage for a single load in the analyzed system. This load may model a
single household or a single asynchronous motor in an industrial process,
but may also model a whole distribution network or a large factory. The
single point load will be interrupted as soon as the supply to the busbar to
which it is connected is interrupted. A multi-point damage model describes
the interruption damage for an area or a large industrial proces which are
supplied by more than one bus. The multi-point model has an additional
trigger condition which defines the combinations of busbars that must be
interrupted in order for the damage function to apply.
In [46], the impacts of interruptions are classified as direct vs. indirect and
economic vs. otherwise (social). Short interruptions in a small residential
area will normally only cause direct damage, such as food spoilage or in-
convenient building temperatures. More wide-spread interruptions with a
longer duration will also cause indirect damage such as civil disobedience,
breakdown of logistics chains, etc.
The classification into direct and indirect costs, and into economic and non-
economic costs, is not further discussed here. It is assumed that the impacts
of interruptions can be quantified into cost functions, regardless of the nature
of the impacts.
Interruption damage functions are often abstract estimations of the actual
interruption damage. Actual interruption damage may depend on
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• The type of interrupted customers
• The duration of the interruption
• The situation in which the interruption occurs: day of week, time of
day, customer’s activities at the moment of interruption, etc.
As a different damage function can be assigned to each specific customer or
customer mix, the dependency of the damage function itself can be further
confined to
• The duration of the interruption
• The moment of occurrence
When we consider the moment of occurrence, then we would have to de-
fine damage functions for all recurrent situations for which the interruption
damage is know to differ significantly. That could mean, for instance, that
we have to define different damage functions for different times of the day,
for different days of week, etc. Although it would be possible to create and
use arrays of damage functions for each customer, we would like to avoid it
and use only one single damage function for each customer.
Specifying damage functions for specific intervals in time will only make a
difference when there is also a significant difference in the probability of oc-
curring for specific types of interruptions in these intervals. If interruptions
are equally likely to occur during periods of high interruption costs as dur-
ing low cost periods, then we can average the damage costs by using the
relative length of each period.
If we do not consider a time-dependent probability for the occurrence of
interruptions, then we can thus use interruption damage models which are
only dependent on the duration of the interruption. This approximation is
used in most studies. Considering the time-dependency of the interruption
damage function only affects that results when also the time dependency of
the failure rates are included in the calculations.
4.2.1 Sector Customer Damage Function
Data collected from customer surveys is used to create damage functions
for certain classes or “sectors” of customers. These surveys give information
80 May 12, 2003
Interruption Costs Assessment
about the perceived interruption costs for each specific customer separately,
and may contain information about the effect of the duration of the interrup-
tion, the time of occurrence, the amount of interrupted power or energy, etc.
The “raw” data from the customer surveys has to be processed and trans-
formed in order to create customer damage functions (CDF) which can also
be projected upon customers which have not been surveyed.
The first step in the data transformation is performed by grouping all raw
damage functions according to some customer classification, for instance
the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification). Typical customer classes, or
sectors, are “residential”, “industrial”, “commercial” , “government”, etc.
The raw damage functions are then normalized per group by using a specific
customer parameter. This normalization parameter may be the measured
yearly peak demand, the yearly energy consumption, a combination of peak
demand and energy consumption, or other values. In some cases, normal-
ization for shorter durations is done to annual peak demand, and to annual
energy consumption for longer durations ([19]).
When the normalization parameter is known for each raw damage function,
then averaged damage functions can be calculated as
C(s, d) =
N(s)∑
i=1
C(s, i, d)
F (s, i)
(4.1)
where, for sector s and interruption duration d,
• C(s, d) is the averaged damage function,
• N(s) is the number of raw damage functions,
• C(s, i, d) is the raw damage function for customer i, and
• F (s, i) is the normalization factor for customer i
When the normalization factor is only known for the whole group of raw
damage functions, then an aggregating process can be used, for which
C ′(s,D) =
∑N(s)
i=1 C(s, i, d)∑N(s)
i=1 F (s, i)
(4.2)
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SCDF 5000 kWh 8000 kWh
duration $/kWh $ $
20 min. 0.0000235 0.12 0.19
1 hr 0.0000972 0.49 0.78
2 hrs 0.000273 1.37 2.18
4 hrs 0.000520 2.60 4.16
8 hrs 0.00129 6.45 10.32
1 day 0.00597 29.85 47.76
2 days 0.0138 69.00 110.40
Table 4.1: SCDF and scaled CDF for two customers
and C ′(s,D) ≤ C(s,D). Mixtures of averaging and aggregating can be used
when some, but not all, normalization factors are known.
The resulting averaged or aggregated damage function for a specific sector
of customers is called a Sector Customer Damage Function or SCDF.
4.2.2 Composite Customer Damage Function
The SCDF is not used in the actual reliability assessment itself. It is only
used to create damage functions for single customers or for mixes of cus-
tomers. The normalization process leads to SCDFs which have units like
$/kWh or $/kW. In some cases these units have been misinterpreted as
costs per energy not supplied or per interrupted power.
If we want to create a customer damage function (CDF) for a single cus-
tomer, then we need the SCDF for the sector and the normalization factor
for the customer. If yearly energy consumption has been used, then the
SCDF will be in $/kWh. The CDF is then obtained by multiplying the SCDF
with the customer’s yearly consumption. This is illustrated in table 4.1, where
a SCDF is scaled to a customer of 5000 kWh and to a customer with 8000
kWh.
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If we need to create damage functions for a mix of customers, then we have
to create a composite customer damage function (CCDF). The CCDF is ba-
sically the sum of the individual customer damage functions in the customer
mix. It can be constructed by taking the relative contribution of the various
customer sectors to the overall normalization factor. The weighted sum of
the different SCDFs according to these relative contributions is then multi-
plied by the overall factor.
4.3 Use of Damage Functions
The CDF and CCDF that result from the scaling of one or more SCDF’s
define the damage for each interruption as a function of the interruption du-
ration. This information is combined with the results of the FEA to calculate
annual interruption costs for each load point and for the whole system.
4.3.1 Interruption Costs Calculations
The stochastic failure models are used to create specific system states
which are then analyzed. Such analysis may include load flow calculations
and topological analysis, but may also include power system protection al-
gorithms, power restoration procedures and optimization methods, during
which the network is reconfigured and generation may be rescheduled.
The principle objective of the system state analysis is to express the ability
of the system to meet the load demands in preliminary performance indica-
tors. These preliminary indicators are then used, at the end of the system
state creation and analysis phase, to calculate overall performance indica-
tors. The interruption costs indicators express the expected costs per year
due to load interruptions. For each load point, the LPEIC (load point ex-
pected interruption costs, $/a) indicator expresses the total expected costs
per year due to the interruptions of the load point.
By drawing outcomes for the stochastic conditional state durations for each
component, the duration of the current state and the number of the next
state are determined. When the current state duration has passed, a transi-
tion to the next state is made and new outcomes can be drawn to determine
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the new duration and the following state. In this way, a possible history for
the component can be simulated in time. By performing a parallel simula-
tion of all components in the system, the whole system can be simulated in
time. This way of generating system states in a chronological order is called
“Monte-Carlo simulation”.
Each time a new system state is reached during the Monte-Carlo simulation,
it is analyzed for performance. Because the simulation of one single period
of, for instance, 5 years, would not make it possible to derive accurate overall
performance indicators, it is necessary to simulate and analyze the same
period a large number of times. The LPEIC is then calculated as
LPEIC =
∑I
i=1C(di)
K · analyzed period (4.3)
where C(di) is a single outcome of the interruption cost function C, for the
simulated duration di, I is the total number of interruptions of the considered
load point during the whole Monte-Carlo analysis, and K is the number of
times the analyzed period (the length of which is expressed in years) was
simulated.
The Monte-Carlo simulation technique is very powerful because it allows for
the simulation of about any possible event in the system and it does not put
any restriction on the stochastic component models. Its big disadvantage,
however, is its high computational demand. The technique of system state
enumeration is therefore often used instead.
In a system state enumeration, all relevant system states are created and
analyzed one by one. In this case, no outcomes are drawn for the stochastic
durations, but the probabilities and frequencies of the system states are
calculated directly. An analytical reliability assessment by state enumeration
produces exact results for the performance indicators.
For the reliability costs indicators, such as the LPEIC, the state enumeration
methods, however, are problematic. In many textbooks and articles (e.g.
[16],[66]), the following equation is used for calculating the LPEIC.
LPEIC =
M∑
i=1
fi · C(di) (4.4)
84 May 12, 2003
Interruption Costs Assessment
where fi is the frequency of the ith system state that causes an interruption
of the load point and M is the number of different system states which lead
to such interruption. This equation, however, is principally wrong, as it as-
sumes that all interruptions caused by the ith system state are of duration
di. This is an assumption that can not be justified, as the durations of repairs
or maintenance are stochastic.
The use of (4.4) is often defended by the assumption that power to an in-
terrupted load will be restored by network reconfiguration, and not by re-
pair. Network reconfiguration is often modeled by deterministic switching
durations. Three arguments against the use of (4.4) in a state enumerated
reliability assessment can be formulated:
1. It is often unknown if power can be restored to all interrupted loads by
network reconfiguration alone in all cases. One objective of a reliability
assessment may be to find cases where switched power restoration is
not possible.
2. The financial risk related to interruption costs cannot be assumed to
be determined by the majority of cases in which the restoration pro-
cedures work as planned. Load interruption during unusual system
conditions may lead to unexpected high restoration durations. Such
may happen in the case of failing protection devices, stuck breakers,
unavailable (backup) transmission lines, peak load situations, etc.
3. Wide area power systems, or systems in rural areas, may lack the
required network reconfiguration options or may require the modeling
of switching times as stochastic quantities.
4. Statistical data shows a considerable spread in interruption duration
([30], [97], [43])
For a correct calculation of interruption costs or other reliability cost indi-
cators, it is therefore necessary to assess the duration distribution of all
interruptions during a state enumerated reliability assessment. This is pos-
sibly by using the Weibull-Markov model, as introduces in chapter 3. The
calculation proceeds as follows:
• Expression (3.92) is evaluated for each stochastic model prior to the
actual state enumeration
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• Expression (3.91) is evaluated for each system state for which the
probability distribution of the duration is required.
This means that, if
• a CDF or CCDF has been defined as a vector {C(Tj)} for the interrup-
tion durations {T1, · · · , TNc}
• the probability Pr(Tj−1 < Di < Tj) for the state duration Di can be
calculated using (3.92).
then the expected interruption costs for the for the ith system state can be
calculated as
E(Ci(d)) =
Nc∑
j=1
Pr(Tj−1 < Di < Tj) · C(Tj) (4.5)
where Di is the stochastic system state duration.
With (4.5), the annual LPEIC can then be calculated as
LPEIC =
M∑
i=1
fi · E(Ci(d)) (4.6)
where fi is the system state frequency.
The above method for calculating the LPEIC, i.e. using (3.92), (3.91) and
(4.5) to evaluate (4.6) seems very complicated and time consuming. Indeed,
when compared with (4.4), a slight increase in efforts cannot be denied.
However, it has been found in practice that the evaluation of the LPEIC in the
described way increases the total computation time only very slightly. When
the proposed method is analyzed for required computational demands, it is
clear why the computational demand is very moderate:
• Expression (3.92) is evaluated for each stochastic component sepa-
rately, and only has to be analyzed once, prior to the reliability analy-
sis. The results can be stored with the stochastic model model. The
computational demand is thus very low or zero.
86 May 12, 2003
Interruption Costs Assessment
• Expression (3.91) is evaluated for each analyzed system state. The
computation demand is very small, as it only requires the multiplication
or addition of a few known factors.
• The evaluation of (4.5) and (4.6) is very fast, and linear with the number
of load points.
The low computational demands and the very simple expressions that are to
be evaluated, of which the most complex can be evaluated a-priori, make the
proposed method of calculating the LPEIC elegant, transparent and practi-
cal.
4.4 Effects of the Interruption Duration Distribution
The ability to calculate reliability worth on the basis of the probability distri-
bution of the interruption duration is only of practical use when the shape of
this distribution is relevant. It is easy to define customer damage functions
for which the LPEIC would become highly dependent on the interruption du-
ration distributions. It is also clear that the use of linear damage functions,
results in a LPEIC that is completely independent of the interruption dura-
tion distribution. It is therefore required to evaluated the importance of the
interruption duration distributions on the basis of realistic damage functions.
A number of customer surveys have been undertaken in various countries
over the whole world in the last decades. The Cigré Task Force 38.06.01
discusses the use of interruption costs functions in power system analysis,
and has published an overview of surveyed data in ([46]).
One of the conclusions of the task force is that “The actual event based
approach can provide ECOST values which are significantly different from
those obtained by the average event (analytical) method if the applied CDF
are highly non-linear.” ([46]). Although the report continues by saying that
“In most cases, however, either technique will provide acceptable results.”,
it does not indicate in which cases average event methods give acceptable
results and in which cases they produce unacceptable errors.
In order to quantify the errors in calculated LPEIC values, the published
customer damage functions in [46] where analyzed for their sensitivity to
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the probability distribution of the interruption duration. This analysis was
performed in the following way:
• A Weibull distribution of the interruption duration was presumed.
• The mean costs per interruption was evaluated for various values of
the β-shape factor of the duration distribution, and for four different
mean durations. A linear interpolation of the customer damage was
used for interruption durations in between the discrete values of the
damage function.
• The resulting four functions, each of which gives the mean costs as
function of the β factor for a certain mean duration, are divided by the
mean costs for a unity shape factor, i.e. for β = 1.
• The value of the relative mean costs was interpreted as an “error func-
tion” which indicates the possible error that could result when the dam-
age function is used in a reliability calculation in which the duration
distribution is either not considered or modeled incorrectly.
The Weibull distribution is chosen as a model for the interruption duration
distribution because measurements indicate that interruption durations are
often more or less Weibull distributed ([128]). Another reason is that the
Weibull distribution also covers the exponential distribution, and a compari-
son with results from a homogenous Markov model is therefore possible.
The SCDF for commercial customers in Canada, according to [46], is used
here as example, to describe the above analysis method in more detail. The
SCDF is shown in table 4.2, in 1999 US$. The mean interruption costs for a
Weibull distributed interruption duration, was calculated as
EC(β, µ) = EC(β, η(µ)) =
∫ ∞
0
C(τ) · β
ηβ
τβ−1 exp
[
−
(
τ
η
)β]
dτ (4.7)
where η = η(µ) is the scale factor of the Weibull distribution which corre-
sponds to a mean of µ and where C(τ) is the SCDF, in this example accord-
ing to table 4.2, which was linearly interpolated.
The function EC(β, µ = M) describes the dependency of the interruption
costs to the β form factor, for a fixed mean duration M . Each of these
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$/kW
2 sec. 0.232
1 min. 1.63
20 min. 4.83
1 hr 13.0
2 hrs 27.3
4 hrs 65.7
8 hrs 106
1 day 127
Table 4.2: SCDF for “Canada, Commercial, $/kW”
functions is subsequently divided by EC(1.0,M), which results in an “error
function” which describes the deviations for various β-factors independently
of the used SCDF. These error functions have been calculated for a mean
duration (µ) of 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour and 4 hours. The results for
the example SCDF are depicted in Fig.4.1.
The error function for a mean duration of 4 hours in Fig.4.1 shows values
in excess of 20% for β > 2.5. This means, for the example SCDF, that not
regarding the effects of the interruption duration distribution correctly could
lead to errors of 20% or more in the calculated LPEIC index.
The analysis described above was carried out on all damage functions pub-
lished in ([46]). The largest deviations which were found are listed in table
4.3. The results of all analyzed damage functions are shown in appendix A.
Note that these results are based on “average customers” and interruption
durations with a Weibull probability distribution. For individual customers
and other distributions, the results may even be larger. However, no data
was available to substantiate this.
From the analysis of the damage functions, it is clear that the dependency
of the interruption costs to the interruption duration and the probability distri-
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SCDF largest deviation
Saudi Arabia Residential 66 %
Saudi Arabia Industrial 45 %
Saudi Arabia Commercial 39 %
Norway Agriculture 33 %
Greece Companies+organisations 27 %
Australia Commercial 25 %
Canada Commercial 25 %
Nepal Commercial 25 %
Greece Commercial total 23 %
Denmark Household 22 %
Sweden Commercial 20 %
Australia Major User 19 %
Greece Business 19 %
Sweden Agriculture 19 %
Australia Residential 18 %
Sweden Residential 18 %
Great Britain Industrial 16 %
Greece Industrial 16 %
Table 4.3: Largest deviations for analyzed international CDF.
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Figure 4.1: PDF dependency for “Canada, Commercial, $/kW”
bution of that duration cannot always be ignored. It would be allowed to ig-
nore these factors when damage function are used which are (almost) linear
functions of the interruption durations. The use of homogenous calculation
methods will produce correct results for such functions. In all other cases,
the use of homogenous methods bears the risk of producing reliability worth
indices with large errors.
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Example
An example is shown here for an 11kV distribution system. This system is a
modification of the test system described in [6], which was based on a real
UK system. This system is chosen here because of its size and complexity.
5.1 Description of the Test System
A single line diagram of the test system is displayed in Fig.5.1. Some pa-
rameters describing the size of the test system are given in table 5.1.
The test system is a radially operated distribution network, in which all loads
can be fed from two sides.
Test System Parameters
Number of Nodes 85
Number of Lines 30
Number of transformers 13
Number of Loads 56
Total Demand 52.08 MW
Table 5.1: Size of the test system.
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Figure 5.1: The distribution test system
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$ $/kW $/kWh
2 sec. 122 0.232 0.00105
1 min. 148 1.63 0.000986
20 min. 347 4.83 0.00235
1 hr 1023 13.0 0.00700
2 hrs 1806 27.3 0.0123
4 hrs 3767 65.7 0.0278
8 hrs 6756 106 0.0477
1 day 14831 127 0.0987
Table 5.2: Interruption Cost Function
The peak load demands for the load points are listed in table 5.3. Each load
point was given a fixed number of customers,which is also listed in table
5.3. All loads have the same interruption cost function, according to table
5.2. This cost function is the one for the commercial customers in Canada,
according to [46]. The SCDF per kW peak demand was used by all loads
and was automatically scaled to the kW peak demand (according to table
5.3) during the reliability assessment.
The failure data used for lines, cables, transformers and busbars is listed
in tables 5.4 and 5.5. Common mode failure models were defined for the
cables which are encircled in the single line diagram. The data for these
common failures is shown in table 5.4.
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Name MW MVAr Cust. Name MW MVAr Cust.
C02a 0.50 0.020 100 C11a 0.40 0.081 80
C02b 0.52 0.020 104 C11b 0.30 0.061 60
C02c 0.40 0.020 80 C11c 0.40 0.081 80
C02d 0.90 0.183 180 C12a 1.50 0.305 300
C03a 0.54 0.020 108 C12b 1.20 0.244 240
C03b 0.62 0.020 124 C12c 1.20 0.244 240
C03c 1.10 0.223 220 C13a 2.20 0.447 440
C04a 0.90 0.183 180 C13b 2.20 0.447 440
C04b 0.40 0.081 80 C14a 0.10 0.020 20
C04c 1.60 0.325 320 C14b 0.10 0.020 20
C05a 1.00 0.203 200 C14c 1.70 0.345 340
C05b 1.40 0.284 280 C15a 1.80 0.366 360
C05c 2.30 0.020 460 C15b 0.70 0.142 140
C06a 1.00 0.203 200 C15c 1.20 0.244 240
C06b 1.40 0.284 280 C16a 0.10 0.020 20
C06c 1.90 0.386 380 C16b 0.10 0.020 20
C07a 1.20 0.244 240 C16c 0.80 0.162 160
C07b 0.90 0.183 180 C17a 0.10 0.020 20
C07c 2.10 0.426 420 C17b 0.10 0.020 20
C08a 0.74 0.150 148 C17c 1.40 0.284 280
C08b 0.90 0.183 180 C20a 0.10 0.020 20
C09a 0.74 0.150 148 C20b 1.40 0.284 280
C09b 0.74 0.150 148 C21a 0.10 0.020 20
C09c 0.74 0.150 148 C21b 0.30 0.061 60
C09d 0.74 0.150 148 C21c 0.50 0.102 100
C10a 0.90 0.183 180 C22a 1.40 0.284 280
C10b 0.90 0.183 180 C22b 1.70 0.345 340
C10c 0.40 0.081 80 C23a 1.50 0.305 300
Table 5.3: Load Data
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Name Failure Repair
Frequency Mean β
1/a h
Cables 0113a + 0113b 0.01 300 2.0
Cables 02a + 02b 0.03 300 2.0
Lines 0109 + 0110 0.05 300 2.0
Lines 0113a + 0113b 0.05 300 2.0
11kV Cables 3.2/100km 33.5 3.5
33kV Cables 3.2/100km 33.5 3.5
33kV Overhead Lines 2.5/100km 212 3.5
Transformers 0.02 343 1.5
Table 5.4: Common mode and branch failure data
BusBar Failure Field Failure Repair
Name Freq. Freq. Mean β
1/a 1/a h
11kV Bar 0.002 0.005 14 2.5
33kV Bar 0.0025 0.015 24 2.5
Table 5.5: Busbar failure data
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System Indices
Customer Avg. Interruption Frequency Index CAIFI 0.128 1/Ca
Customer Avg. Interruption Duration Index CAIDI 5.92 h
Avg. Service Availability Index ASAI 99.9913 %
Energy Not Supplied ENS 39.6 MWh/a
Avg. Customer Curtailment Index ACCI 3.80 kWh/Ca
Expected Interruption Cost EIC 259 k$/a
Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate IEAR 6.55 $/kWh
Table 5.6: Overall system reliability indices
A reliability assessment was made for the whole system in the single line
diagram. Overlapping failures were not considered. The reliability assess-
ment produced overall system indices as well as indices for all individual
load points in the system. Interruption costs were also calculated for every
individual load point and for the overall system.
The first calculation was made using the β-factors for the Weibull distribu-
tions of the repair durations, as shown in the tables 5.4 and 5.5. The results
for some system indices are shown in table 5.6. In table 5.7, the results
for the 20 load points with the highest interrupted customer-frequency are
shown.
The 10 highest and 10 lowest values for the ACIF and the ACIT are shown
in the bar-graphs of Fig.5.2 and Fig.5.3.
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Load Point Indices
Name LPIF LPIT AID LPENS LPEIC ACIF ACIT
C/a Ch/a h MWh/a k$/a 1/a h/a
C14c 70.3 239.0 3.40 1.19 9.49 0.207 0.703
C20b 67.6 166.6 2.46 0.83 8.20 0.242 0.595
C12a 64.1 293.2 4.58 1.47 11.69 0.214 0.977
C07a 52.2 184.7 3.54 0.92 5.96 0.218 0.770
C15c 52.2 251.8 4.82 1.26 12.76 0.218 1.049
C12b 51.2 234.5 4.58 1.17 9.35 0.214 0.977
C23a 47.4 272.0 5.74 1.36 7.63 0.158 0.907
C07c 42.0 247.2 5.89 1.24 7.13 0.100 0.589
C07b 39.2 143.1 3.65 0.72 4.65 0.218 0.795
C06c 38.0 306.9 8.08 1.53 7.55 0.100 0.808
C12c 37.9 139.6 3.68 0.70 6.06 0.158 0.582
C06b 37.8 221.3 5.86 1.11 6.72 0.135 0.791
C22a 37.8 157.1 4.16 0.79 4.48 0.135 0.561
C13a 33.9 471.4 13.91 2.36 13.36 0.077 1.071
C13b 33.9 471.4 13.91 2.36 13.36 0.077 1.071
C04c 32.0 176.8 5.53 0.88 4.85 0.100 0.553
C09a 30.5 149.5 4.90 0.75 5.48 0.206 1.010
C09b 30.5 108.9 3.57 0.54 4.07 0.206 0.736
C09c 30.5 103.0 3.37 0.51 3.65 0.206 0.696
C09d 30.5 97.1 3.18 0.49 3.24 0.206 0.656
Table 5.7: Load point reliability indices
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5.2 Markov vs. Weibull-Markov Models
After the first “Weibull-Markov” calculation all β-factors in the failure models
were set to unity. This results in a homogenous Markov system. A reliabil-
ity calculation for the homogenous system was then started without further
changes. The results for all non-monetary indices were the same, as ex-
pected. Only the values for the interruption costs where different. Fig.5.4
shows the bar graphs for the LPEIC index, for both the Weibull-Markov cal-
culation and the homogenous calculation.
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Figure 5.4: Load Point Expected Interruption Costs
The difference between the Markov and the Weibull-Markov calculation is
well over 16 % for the higher values of the LPEIC, and up to 18 % for all
loads. These differences are calculated as relative to the Weibull-Markov
results and can thus be interpreted as the relative error of the homogenous
results.
The differences of 16 % and more are remarkable because power to inter-
rupted loads in the test system can almost always be restored by switching
100 May 12, 2003
Example
actions. Interruptions which are restored by switching have short duration
and therefore cause low costs. Repaired interruptions, on the other hand,
have long duration and therefore cause higher costs. Switching actions were
modeled with deterministic durations. This means that the interruption dura-
tion could be different for different failures, but had always the same duration
for the same failure. The duration of switched restorations is therefore not
affected by a change in a β parameter of a stochastic mode, as no stochastic
mode is used for determining the duration of switched restorations.
However, from the results it is clear that, although the repaired restorations
are less frequent than the switched restorations, they nevertheless have a
significant effect on the overall interruption costs due to the higher cost per
interruption. Otherwise there would not be a difference between the ho-
mogenous and the Weibull-Markov results.
A second comparison was made in which a ‘single penalty’ interruption costs
function was used. This costs function was zero for all interruptions shorter
than 8 hours and equaled 50$ for interruptions with a duration longer than
8 hours. Again, a Weibull-Markov calculation was made, with the original β-
factors, and a homogenous Markov calculation, with all β-factors set to unity
again. The resulting LPEIC values for the Weibull-Markov and the Markov
calculation are shown in Fig.5.5. The difference between the Markov and
the Weibull-Markov results are now exceeding 30 %.
5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation vs. State Enumeration
To investigate the correctness of the interruption costs calculations by an-
alytic state enumeration methods, using Weibull-Markov models, compar-
isons with Monte Carlo simulations were made.
The Monte-Carlo simulation produces averaged values, but also confidence
limits. A 95% confidence level was used. The results of the comparison are
shown in Fig.5.6.
The Fig.5.6 shows that the results of the state enumeration method are
within the 95 % confidence intervals as calculated by the Monte Carlo simu-
lation.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The commonly used homogenous Markov model can be extended to include
Weibull-distributed state durations. The so-called t’t’Weibull-Markov” compo-
nent is a semi-Markov model of a power-system component. Instead of an
exponential distribution, a Weibull distribution is used for the state duration.
A system consisting of Weibull-Markov components is referred to as a Weibull-
Markov system. A Weibull-Markov system does not longer obey the Markov
property. It is therefore not a semi-Markov model. It is shown in this thesis
that it is possible to obtain an analytical expression for the state-duration
distribution for each of the states of the Weibull-Markov system.
The Weibull-Markov stochastic model as introduced in this thesis is “upward
compatible” with the homogenous Markov model. All existing failure data
can also be used for the Weibull-Markov model. The Weibull-Markov model
expands the homogenous Markov model by enabling the assessment of the
probability distribution for the system state durations.
The Weibull-Markov model can be used to obtain more correct results for the
probability distribution of interruptions of the power supply. This distribution
is especially important when estimating the worth of reliability.
The expected annual interruption costs are normally calculated on the basis
of customer damage functions. These damage functions define the costs of
an interruption as a function of the interruption duration.
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The mathematically correct way of calculating the expected interruption cost
is by multiplying the damage function by the probability density function of
the interruption duration. Calculation methods, however, which exclusively
use the homogenous Markov model, are not able to assess this density
function. It is shows in this thesis that, when homogenous Markov models
are used despite this inability, errors of 40 % and more in the calculated
expected interruption costs may result.
It has been shown that the results of an analytical state enumeration method
which uses the Weibull-Markov model, are comparable with the results of
a Monte-Carlo simulation. The computational demands for the proposed
calculation methods are comparable with the demands for the homogenous
Markov methods.
It should also be noted that an analytical method allows more conclusions
to be drawn from the results than a Monte-Carlo simulation.
Summarizing, the proposed methods for calculating expected yearly inter-
ruption costs, based on the Weibull-Markov model,
• give more accurate results for the expected yearly interruption costs
• offer more flexibility in the use of customer damage functions
• do not effectively increase the computational demand
• are simple to implement, and easy to use.
Future work on power-system reliability should include a thorough investiga-
tion of the various duration distributions needed for the component models.
Interesting examples are the modeling of life-time distributions in combina-
tion with maintenance for the time-to-failure, and the modeling of component
repair-time distributions in combination with switching actions for the time-
to-restoration. plement, and easy to use.
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Analyzed International CDF
This appendix gives customer damage functions for a range of customer
sectors in various countries. All damage functions are based on the data
given in [46].
All interruption costs functions shown in this sections are given in 1999 US$.
A.1 Australia
The costs data for Australia was obtained in studies conducted in 1996 and
1997 by the Reliability Research Group at the CEPE, Monash University.
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Residential Commercial Agricultural
$ $/kWh $ $/kWh $ $/kWh
2 sec. 281 0.00188
1 min. 511 0.00163 17.3 0.00456
20 min. 0.162 0.0000235 1156 0.00376 61.0 0.00658
1 hr 0.591 0.0000972 1277 0.00654 126 0.00915
2 hrs 1.60 0.000273 2908 0.00527 184 0.0111
4 hrs 3.30 0.000520 5178 0.00939 433 0.0336
8 hrs 8.04 0.00129 6789 0.0302 885 0.0549
1 day 35.2 0.00597 10468 0.0410 1926 0.151
2 days 81.5 0.0138
Table A.1: Australia, SCDF for “Residential”, “Commercial” and “Agricultural”
Industrial Major User Ind. + Major
$ $/kWh $ $/kWh $ $/kWh
2 sec. 1187 0.000331 4902 0.000175 2383 0.000202
1 min. 1827 0.00115 6114 0.000175 3135 0.000341
20 min. 2176 0.00150 7517 0.000373 3425 0.000593
1 hr 3579 0.00207 15169 0.00121 6944 0.00133
2 hrs 4092 0.00328 14580 0.000709 7089 0.00114
4 hrs 8019 0.00745 22344 0.00133 12269 0.00236
8 hrs 15223 0.0144 57464 0.00439 26286 0.00610
1 day 19974 0.0155 94709 0.00822 40437 0.00933
Table A.2: Australia, SCDF for “Industrial”, “Major User” and “Industrial +
Major User”
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A.2 Canada
The university of Saskatchewan conducted various customer damage sur-
vey in Canada, with some regularity from the 1970’s onwards. Here pub-
lished data is taken from the 1987 survey into agricultural interruption costs,
the 1991 surveys into residential, commercial and industrial customers, and
the 1995 study of interruption costs for government, institute and office build-
ings (GIO).
Agricultural Commercial
$ $/kW $/kWh $ $/kW $/kWh
2 sec. 122 0.232 0.00105
1 min. 148 1.63 0.000986
20 min. 1.13 0.0487 0.0000229 347 4.83 0.00235
1 hr 5.71 0.243 0.000115 1023 13.0 0.00700
2 hrs 1806 27.3 0.0123
4 hrs 47.2 2.02 0.000966 3767 65.7 0.0278
8 hrs 133 5.64 0.00270 6756 106 0.0477
1 day 14831 127 0.0987
Table A.3: Canada, SCDF for “Agricultural” and “Commercial”
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Gov., Inst., Off. Industrial
$ $/kW $/kWh $ $/kW $/kWh
2 sec. 108 1.21 0.000258 907 0.782 0.00790
1 min. 1032 1.87 0.00821
20 min. 344 2.39 0.000803 1489 2.67 0.00868
1 hr 782 5.30 0.00197 2876 5.65 0.0109
2 hrs 4161 10.0 0.0128
4 hrs 2757 15.6 0.00686 7352 20.6 0.0195
8 hrs 12825 38.1 0.0364
1 day 21381 60.7 0.0485
Table A.4: Canada, SCDF for “Government, Institutes, Office Buildings” and
“Industrial”
Residential
$ $/kW $/kWh
20 min. 0.190 0.0241 0.0000121
1 hr 1.10 0.141 0.0000701
4 hrs 12.1 1.57 0.000779
8 hrs 25.8 3.46 0.00172
1 day 117 15.8 0.00784
Table A.5: Canada, SCDF for “Residential”
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A.3 Denmark
The damage functions which have been analyzed are from the 1994 inves-
tigation, which was initiated by the Nordic Council of Ministers. The shown
costs are the interruptions losses as estimated by the customers.
Agri. Household Industry Public Ret. + Serv.
$/kW $/kW $/kW $/kW $/kW
1 sec. 1.17 0.339 0.508
1 min. 3.28 0.339 0.555
15 min 9.57 2.99 1.40
1 hr 55.0 5.42 18.2 7.44 7.04
4 hrs 16.4 35.3 24.7 22.6
8 hrs 226 50.4 58.9 47.5 46.6
Table A.6: Denmark, SCDF for “Agriculture-summer”, “Household”, “Indus-
try”, “Public sector” and “Retail+Service”
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A.4 Great Britain
The analyzed costs are from the 1993 survey, conducted by the Manchester
Centre for Electrical Energy at UMIST (University of Manchester Institute of
Science and Technology). The shown costs are the interruption costs as
perceived by the customers.
Commercial Industrial
$ $/kW $/kWh $ $/kW $/kWh
1 sec. 18.2 1.57 730 1905 9.76 4794
1 min. 18.6 1.62 762 2381 10.3 4968
20 min. 78.0 6.17 2603 4603 22.7 10032
1 hr 168 16.9 7794 6825 40.1 18952
4 hrs 548 62.0 28778 12063 115 51730
8 hrs 1141 125 58825 19048 191 84698
1 day 1587 159 75524 25873 239 106508
Table A.7: Great Britain, SCDF for “Commercial” and “Industrial”
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Large user Residential
$ $/kW $/kWh $ $/kW $/kWh
1 sec. 342857 10.7 1698
1 min. 342857 10.7 1698
20 min. 347619 10.9 1730 0.302 0.238 95.2
1 hr 369841 11.4 2159 1.11 0.857 333
4 hrs 522222 14.1 2413 7.59 5.92 2286
8 hrs 655556 15.4 2714
1 day 922222 21.2 3794
Table A.8: Great Britain, SCDF for “Large user” and “Residential”
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A.5 Greece
The analyzed costs functions are from the 1997 and 1998 surveys by the
Power Systems Laboratory of the National Technical University of Athens
(NTUA).
Business Comm. Comp. & Org. Industrial
$/kW $/kW $/kW $/kW
1 sec. 0.217 0.592 1.03 1.97
3 min. 0.250 0.723 1.28 2.37
20 min. 0.706 1.71 2.85 6.02
1 hr 2.02 3.73 5.48 9.52
2 hrs 4.09 7.55 11.1 13.7
4 hrs 8.34 12.9 16.9 18.7
1 day 27.7 31.5 31.4 41.0
Table A.9: Greece, SCDF for “Business”, “Commercial total”, “Compa-
nies+organisations” and “Industrial”
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A.6 Iran
The analyzed interruption cost functions originate from the 1995 survey by
the TAVANIR company in Iran.
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Commercial Industrial Residential
$/kW $/kW $/kW
2 sec. 0.00566 0.180
1 min. 0.00566 0.180
20 min. 0.0646 0.304
1 hr 1.21 1.92 0.793
2 hrs 3.64 4.80 2.38
Table A.10: Iran, SCDF for “Commercial”, “Industrial” and “Residential”
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A.7 Nepal
The shown interruption costs functions are from the 1996 surveys con-
ducted in Nepal by the power Systems Research Group at the University
of Saskatchewan.
Commercial Industrial
$ $/kW $/kWh $ $/kW $/kWh
1 min. 4.74 0.678 0.000195 32.9 0.0917 0.0000233
20 min. 8.49 2.32 0.000664 66.3 0.201 0.0000510
1 hr 9.04 5.00 0.00143 196 0.364 0.0000924
2 hrs 14.4 12.0 0.00344 263 0.502 0.000127
4 hrs 21.8 19.7 0.00565 362 1.29 0.000327
8 hrs 38.6 27.9 0.00799 532 2.58 0.000655
1 day 48.0 36.1 0.0104 852 9.45 0.00240
Table A.11: Nepal, SCDF for “Commercial” and “Industrial”
Residential
$ $/kW $/kWh
20 min. 0.0320 0.0270 0.0000155
1 hr 0.169 0.143 0.0000815
4 hrs 0.873 0.747 0.000427
8 hrs 1.78 1.54 0.000876
1 day 6.40 5.51 0.00314
2 days 13.8 11.8 0.00675
Table A.12: Nepal, SCDF for “Residential”
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A.8 Norway
The analyzed interruption costs functions are from the 1989-1991 survey
which was initiated by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Direc-
torate (NVE) and performed by the Centre for Research in Economics and
Business Administration (SNF).
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Agriculture Commercial Industry Residential
$/kW $/kW $/kW $/kW
1 min. 0.907 1.33
1 hr 0.147 4.73 6.79 0.293
4 hrs 1.97 19.8 21.4 4.48
8 hrs 8.32 45.5 42.5 10.7
Table A.13: Norway, SCDF for “Agriculture”, “Commercial”, “Industry” and
“Residential”
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A.9 Portugal
The analyzed interruption cost functions are from the 1997-1998 surveys.
Residential
$ $/kWh
5 min. 5.36 0.00168
30 min. 7.78 0.00238
2 hrs 25.4 0.00753
6 hrs. 59.4 0.0175
Table A.14: Portugal, SCDF for “Residential”
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A.10 Saudi Arabia
The analyzed interruption costs functions are from the surveys which started
in 1998 and from the surveys on 1992. The residential costs was based on
willingness to pay.
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Commercial Industrial Residential
$/kWh $/kWh $/kW $/kWh
20 min. 1.05 17.9 0.120 0.0572
1 hr 2.60 132 0.451 0.215
4 hrs 52.7 261 2.45 1.17
8 hrs 263 1558 26.0
Table A.15: Saudi Arabia, SCDF for “Commercial”, “Industrial” and “Resi-
dential”
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A.11 Sweden
The analyzed interruption cost functions are from the surveys which have
been published in 1994, and which were funded by the Swedish Electricity
Distributors.
Agriculture Commercial Large Ind. Mining Ind.
$/kW $/kW $/kW $/kW
2 min. 0.581 1.74 2.35 0.375
1 hr 2.71 8.00 5.46 0.775
4 hrs 9.68 29.6 12.1 2.79
8 hrs 27.8 88.2 22.2 4.44
Table A.16: Sweden, SCDF for “Agriculture”, “Commercial”, “Large Indus-
trial” and “Mining Industry”
Residential Small Industrial Textile Industry
$/kW $/kW $/kW
2 min. 0.103 1.20 11.7
1 hr 0.310 4.70 15.8
4 hrs 1.18 19.2 31.1
8 hrs 3.31 41.3 53.0
Table A.17: Sweden, SCDF for “Residential”, “Small Industrial” and “Textile
Industry”
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Appendix B
Glossary of Terms
Stochastic power system component. A power system component is said
to be stochastic when it has more than one functional states in which
it may reside, and when the time spend in each state, and the number
of the next state are both stochastic quantities.
Stochastic component behavior. The stochastic behavior of a component
is the description of the way in which the component changes from one
state to another. This includes
• all the possible transitions from one state to another
• the distribution function for the stochastic durations for each pos-
sible state
• the probabilities for the transitions to other states, given the cur-
rent state.
Component A component is a typical part of the electric power system
which is treated as one single object in the reliability analysis. Ex-
amples are a single breaker, a transformer, a line, a generator, etc.
Components may reside in different states, such as ’being available’,
’being repaired’, etc.
System A ‘system’ is short for an electrical power system. A system is
build from components and changes state when one of its components
changes state. The resulting ’system state’ is the combination of all
component states.
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Event An event is a transition of a component between its states.
Outage An component outage is defined as the situation in which the com-
ponent cannot be used, either because it has been taken out of ser-
vice deliberately (‘planned’ outage), either because it has failed (‘un-
planned’, or ‘forced’, outage).
Healthy State A healthy system state is a situation in which no unplanned
outages are present.
Contingency A contingency is a system state in which one or more un-
planned outages are present.
Coherent System Also called “consistent system”. A system in which ad-
ditional outages will never improve the system’s performance.
Active Failure A failure of a component which activates the automatic pro-
tection system. Active failures are normally associated with short-
circuits.
Adequacy The ability of the electrical power system to meet the load de-
mands under various steady state system conditions.
Availability The fraction of time a component is able to operate as intended,
either expressed as real fraction, or as hours per year.
Base State A system state in which no failures or outages are present.
Distribution Function The distribution function for the stochastic quantity
X equals the cumulative density function CDF(x).
CDF(x) = the probability of X to take a value smaller than x.
Failure A failure is an undesirable event of a component.
Failure Effect Analysis (FEA) The electrical steady state and/or dynamic
analysis of the system, possibly combined with network reconfigura-
tion, generator rescheduling, or other alleviation techniques, in order
to assess the loads which are lost or which have to be curtailed and
the duration for which these loads are not supplied.
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Hazard Rate Function The function HRF(x), describing the probability of
a stochastic quantity to be larger than x+dx, given the fact that it is
larger than x, divided by dx. The hazard rate may thus describe the
probability of a element to fail in the next period of time, given the
fact that it is still functioning properly. The hazard rate is often used
to describe ageing and wear out. A famous example is the so-called
“bath-tub” function which describes the probability of a device to fail in
the next period of time during wear-in, normal service time and wear-
out.
Hidden Failure An event of a component which will prevent it from operat-
ing as intended the next time will be called upon.
Interruption An unplanned zero-voltage situation at one or more load points
due to outages in the system.
Maintenance The planned removal of one or more primary components
from the system.
(n-1) system A system for which all relevant components are redundant
units.
(n-k) system A system for which the outage of any k components will never
lead to an interruption in the base state.
Outage The removal of a primary component from the system.
Passive Failure A failure of a component which does not activate the auto-
matic protection system.
Probability Density Function The function PDF(x), describing the proba-
bility of the stochastic quantity to take a value from an interval around
x, divided by the length of that interval. The PDF(x) is the derivative of
the CDF(x).
Redundant Unit A component which outage will never lead to an interrup-
tion in the base state, but for which at least one contingency state
exists for which its additional outage will lead to an interruption.
Repair The restoration of the functionality of a component, either by replac-
ing the component or by repairing it.
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Scheduled Outage The planned removal of a primary component from the
system, i.e. for preventive maintenance.
Security The ability of the system to meet the loads demands during and
after a transient or dynamic disturbance of the system.
Spare Unit A reserve component, not connected to the system, which may
be used as a replacement for a component on outage by switching or
replacing.
Statistic Statistic calculation methods are used to analyze stochastic quan-
tities. A simple example is the method for calculating a mean repair
duration by dividing the total time spend repairing by the number of
repairs performed.
Information obtained by using statistic tools on measured data can be
used to build stochastic models of the observed equipment.
Stochastic A quantity is said to be stochastic when its value is random and
thus unknown. The range of possible values, however, may be known
as well as the likelihood of these possible values. The number of eyes
thrown with a dice is random, the possible outcomes are {1,2,3,4,5,6}
and the likelihood is 16 for each outcome. For a continuous range of
possible outcomes, the likelihood is a continuous function, known as
the Probability Density Function or “PDF”.
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